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Abstract
The above considerations demonstrate, however, the importance of the questions regarding the
nature and the scope of admissible cartel evidence, especially in regard to the issues of due process
in general and of the obligation to safeguard the rights of the defense against the prosecution in
particular. Obviously, the fundamental principle governing these issues is commonly known and
universally accepted: no one can be prosecuted or condemned without concrete evidence of the
infringement of which the defendant is accused. The legal and procedural requirements concerning
cartel evidence are therefore closely related to the powers of investigation entrusted to the EC
Commission to enable the Commission to perform its supervisory tasks in antitrust cases. The
protection of individual rights of persons and firms involved in anti-cartel procedures as well as
the respect of the rights of the defense form part of the community legal order and are safeguarded
by the CFI and the Court of Justice.
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INTRODUCTION
In this new era of free market capitalism, some voices from
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean were quick to criticize recent
European Economic Community ("EEC") antitrust policy as
yet another "statist" interventionism in the free play of market
forces. The Commission of the European Communities (the
"Commission") has often received bitter comments on its per-
sistence in scrutinizing commercial agreements and structural
operations between market operators and undoubtedly will
continue to receive similar comments in the future as its poli-
cies in some sectors, like merger control or services liberaliza-
tion, continue to develop. However, even amidst those who
would welcome some deregulation in this area, prohibition of
cartels seems inevitable. Indeed, to quote Abbott B. Lipsky in
a recent article, no economy that claims to be free can exist
without effective deterrence of cartels.'
Cartels are essentially agreements between independent
companies or associations, concluded for a joint purpose, apt
to influence, by restraining or eliminating competition, the
production or commercialization and in general to alter market
conditions regarding certain goods or services. European
Community ("EC") competition law provides no definition of
the term. According to most analysts of industrial economy,
one of the conditions for the successful implementation of a
cartel is to keep the number of participants as limited as possi-
ble: first, because it is easier to ensure that all members com-
ply with internal rules and respect cartel arrangements; sec-
ond, in order to limit participation to companies having com-
parable market power and relatively homogeneous production;
and third, to keep the arrangements secret, especially if public
1. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Deterring Cartel Behavior: Harmonies and Disharmonies,
Problems and Solutions, 60 ANTITRUST LJ. 563 (1992).
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authorities do not support or tolerate the cartel and are willing
to enforce some kind of antitrust legislation.
Prohibited in the United States,2 in the European Commu-
nity, 3 as well as in most industrialized countries,4 cartels never-
theless continue to flourish and prosper. Interventions of the
public authorities, national or international, often appear to
reach only the emerged point of an iceberg of anti-competitive
practices. These practices ensure, to the detriment of consum-
ers, the prosperity of industrial groups concerned more about
their financial safety and the profits they reap from a stable
competitive situation than about taking risks and progressing
in the market through better and cheaper products. Increasing
economic interdependence in the industrialized world makes,
however, some sort of harmonization of anti-cartel rules and
procedures necessary on global scale.5 Particularly, import
and export cartels are increasingly in the center of a heated
discussion on possible solutions for the elimination of trade
barriers.6 Unfortunately the Commission/United States Gov-
2. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 1 (1958), amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [treaty as amended here-
inafter referred to as EEC Treaty]. Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty prohibits all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition and affect interstate
trade. Id. art. 85(1).
4. See, e.g., Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947, as amended, 1982 (Japanese Antimonopoly Law) arts.
2(6), 3, reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF
JAPAN 213 (1988). Some strengthening ofJapanese antitrust regulations and tougher
enforcement procedures are necessary if they are to become internationally accepta-
ble. See Hideki Ogawa, Strengthening Japan's Anti-monopoly Regulations, 14 WORLD
COMp. L. & ECON. REV. 67, 67-73 (1991) (commenting on the U.S.-Japan Structural
Impediment Initiative negotiations).
5. See Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World:
Why, What and How, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 593 (1992) (commenting on global anti-cartel
harmonization).
6. See Mitsuo Matsushita, The Role of Competition Law and Policy in Reducing Trade
Barriers in Japan, 14 WORLD ECON. 181, 189 (1991) (arguing that an internationally
agreed norm which controls both export and import cartels is necessary to maintain
competition in international trade); Yoshio Ohara, International Application of the Japa-
nese Antimonopoly Act, 28 Swiss REV. INT. COMP. L. 5, 14-20 (1986) (discussing Japa-
nese FTC decisions against international cartels); James F. Rill, Antitrust in a Global
Environment: Conflicts and Resolutions, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 583, 584-85 (1992) (criticizing
the implications of "footnote 159" of the 1988 Enforcement Guidelines on the extra-
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ernment Competition Agreement of September 1991, 7 which
could serve as a basis for future cooperation in anti-cartel mat-
ters, has run into trouble.8
Cartels aim essentially at regulating prices and sales con-
ditions, limiting production or reducing production capacities,
and sharing markets and spheres of influence. All these prac-
tices traditionally are considered most harmful to the establish-
ment of free competition between market operators, which
constitutes undoubtedly the only environment likely to ensure
optimum allocation of resources and continuous economic
progress.
Even if antitrust case law in the European Community
demonstrates that competition rules overseas do not retain any
so called "per se" prohibitions, as does antitrust law in the
United States, most practices of price fixing or market sharing
are considered highly restrictive of competition and are virtu-
ally prohibited per se, insofar as they are excluded from any
possibility of enjoying either an individual or a block exemp-
tion from the application of the antitrust provisions of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"EEC Treaty"). Supervisory authorities enforcing anti-cartel
legislation in the EEC and elsewhere must find the evidence
necessary to prove that the cartel exists and that it infringes
competition rules. Proving the existence of a cartel constitutes
the main difficulty in the vast majority of cases where the anti-
trust authority is proceeding against a secret cartel. Further, in
a more limited number of cases, where the cartel is institu-
tional or publicly known and claims to pursue legitimate goals,
the antitrust authority is faced only with the relatively easier
task of making the infringement of competition rules evident.
The question of evidence in cartel cases is not only an es-
sential but also an actual one, particularly in view of the most
recent developments in the European case law on the matter.
territorial application of U.S. antitrust law against import cartels operated in a for-
eign country).
7. Competition Laws Co-operation Agreement 1991 (EEC-USA), Sept. 23,
1991, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 823.
8. Both member states and commentators have criticized this agreement. See
France v. Commission, Case C-327/91, OJ. C 28/4 (1992) (objecting to agreement
before the Court ofJustice); see also AlanJ. Riley, Nailing theJellyfish: The Illegality of the
EC/US Government Competition Agreement, 13 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 101 (1992) (objecting
to legality of this competition agreement).
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As regards enforcement of anti-cartel legislation in Europe,
the Commission of the European Communities pursues an ac-
tive and determined policy against price fixing and market
sharing cartels by imposing increasingly high fines.9 In the
Polypropylene ' case, the Commission imposed fines on fifteen
petrochemical undertakings for a total amount of
ECU57,850,000 and ECU9,000,000-ECU11,000,000 for each
of the four major producers involved.I t In the PVC 12 case, it
imposed fines on fourteen producers of polyvinyl-chloride for
a total amount of ECU23,500,000 and ECU2,000,000-
ECU4,000,000 for each of the four major producers in-
volved.' 3 In the LdPE 14 case, it imposed fines on seventeen
producers of low-density polyethylene for a total amount of
ECU37,000,000 and ECU3,000,000-ECU5,000,000 for each of
the four major producers involved. 15
However, the European Court of Justice (the "Court of
Justice") and particularly the Court of First Instance (the
"CFI") tend to give to the concept of evidence regarding car-
tels an increasingly strict and restrictive interpretation. In the
Societd Italiano Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA, and PPG Vernante
Pennitalia SpA v. Commission ("Flat Glass") 16 judgment, the CFI
annulled the main part of the provisions of the Commission's
decision 17 relative to a cartel in the flat-glass sector in Italy,
considering that the elements of evidence advanced by the
Commission were not conclusive." Beyond the characteristics
of the specific case, the CFI judgment seems to constitute a
9. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.0. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 87. According to Article 15(2) of Regulation 17/62, fines can reach up to 10%
of the firm's total turnover in its preceding business year. Id. art. 15(2), 0J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 91.
10. 0.J. L 230/1 (1986).
11. Id. at 36-37; see infra notes 147-48 (citing appealed decisions).
12. oJ. L 74/1 (1989).
13. Id. at 18. This decision was annulled by the Court of First Instance on a
technicality. Re the PVC Cartel: BASF AG v. Commission,Joined Cases T-79, 84-86,
89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89, [1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (Ct.
First Instance) [hereinafter PVC].
14. 0J. L 74/21 (1989).
15. Id. at 40.
16. Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302
(Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Flat Glass].
17. Flat glass, OJ. L 33/44 (1989).
18. Id.
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change in the approach followed until now by the Court ofJus-
tice in horizontal cartel cases.
It must be noted that until the CFI judgment in Flat Glass,
the Court of Justice, while insisting on the necessity of a high
standard in proof, had always examined documentary evidence
in the light of the global market behavior of the undertakings
concerned, evaluating the elements of evidence as a whole
rather than examining each document as such, insulated from
every other document. This approach was basically justified,
especially if one considers the obvious imbalance existing in
the power play of documentary discovery in antitrust cases.
On one side, the authors of a secret cartel are in possession of
the evidence concerning the infringement of competition rules
and deploy all necessary efforts to dissimulate it by using all
available means. On the other side, the officials of the antitrust
authority who, whatever the extent of their powers to carry out
investigations and their determination to implement them,
very often are helpless against the sophisticated methods of
dissimulation and destruction of evidence employed by those
responsible for the organization of the cartel. This strategic
advantage enjoyed by cartel members is inherent in all prelimi-
nary investigations against secret cartels and hinders detection,
legal action against and finally repression of this type of in-
fringement that can be particularly dangerous for the public
interest.
The above considerations demonstrate, however, the im-
portance of the questions regarding the nature and the scope
of admissible cartel evidence, especially in regard to the issues
of due process in general and of the obligation to safeguard
the rights of the defense against the prosecution in particular.
Obviously, the fundamental principle governing these issues is
commonly known and universally accepted: no one can be
prosecuted or condemned without concrete evidence of the in-
fringement of which the defendant is accused. The legal and
procedural requirements concerning cartel evidence are there-
fore closely related to the powers of investigation entrusted to
the EC Commission to enable the Commission to perform its
supervisory tasks in antitrust cases.' 9 The protection of indi-
19. See infra text accompanying notes 162-238 (discussing procedural evidence
gathering issues).
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vidual rights of persons and firms involved in anti-cartel proce-
dures as well as the respect of the rights of the defense form
part of the community legal order and are safeguarded by the
CFI and the Court of Justice.
I. CARTELS: DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
The concept of "cartel" does not correspond to any spe-
cific legal form. It must be noted that neither the concept of
"competition" nor the concepts of "agreement" or "concerted
practice" underlying cartel activities are defined in EC anti-
trust rules. Consequently, an attempt to define these concepts
can depart only from an analysis of the object of the agree-
ments between the companies involved in the cartel or of the
effects their agreement or the concerted action might have on
the relevant market.
The concept of competition in Community law bears
hardly any resemblance to the traditional Adam Smith or
David Ricardo theories. It seeks neither the achievement of a
purely competitive environment, where prices are fixed in a
constant dialogue between offer and demand independent of
the action of market operators, nor the establishment of condi-
tions of perfect competition implying the complete and instan-
taneous access of economic players to market information.
Above all, EC competition policy pursues highly pragmatic
objectives which consist in creating an internal European mar-
ket,20 protecting consumers, and ensuring an optimum alloca-
tion of resources and investments. The approach followed by
the Commission to achieve these objectives is also a realistic
one.
In this respect, legal action against cartels arises less from
the construction and implementation of abstract economic the-
ories than from the definition of a coherent policy with regard
to concentration of economic power within a group of eco-
nomic operators. It is not by chance that the French Penal
Code of 1810 already provided in Article 419 for the prosecu-
tion of "those who ... by means of concerted action or coali-
20. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85(1). Cartel agreements or concerted prac-
tices restricting the free movement of goods or services, isolating national markets,
and affecting interstate trade are contrary not only to Articles 30-36 but also to Arti-
cle 85(1) of the EEC Treaty. Id. arts. 30-36, 85(1).
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tion of the main holders of the same good or food product...
will have caused its price to rise or fall... above or below the
price level that would have been determined by natural and
free trade competition. '" 21 The idea, taken up later in Anglo-
American conspiracy law, clearly makes its first appearance
here.
This realistic approach applies also to the concept of
workable competition, which demonstrates further that the
objectives of EC competition policy are of a practical nature
and cannot be easily described in absolute terms. Antitrust ac-
tion is considered successful when the market is allowed to
function spontaneously without artificial obstacles, in other
words, without cartels. This implies in fact the ability of a
given market to regulate itself more or less freely along the
lines of economic theory without being influenced by arbitrary
coalitions that, in the name of private, hardly legitimate or out-
right illegal interests, modify to their profit the natural balance
of goods and prices.
Cartels have as a primary target the private regulation of
the market through the organization and therefore necessarily
the limitation of competition. Of all limitations or distortions
of competition, the process of creating a cartel is the one that
contradicts most radically all principles of free market econ-
omy. It differs from other methods of structural (mergers or
joint ventures) or contractual (exclusive dealing, patent licens-
ing, research and development agreements, etc.) limitations of
competition, in that cartels between companies situated at the
same level of production are generally characterized by their
desire to limit or eliminate free competition, while giving the
illusion of wanting to comply with its rules to some extent. Ex-
perience shows that very often cartels aim at or result in joint
price control, limitation or autolimitation of production capac-
ities or technical innovation, or sharing of geographical or
product markets.
In theory, cartels give priority to the defense of the collec-
tive interests of their members as opposed to the pursuit by
each market operator of its individual interests. In practice,
21. French Penal Code of 1810, C. PaN. art. 419 (Author trans.); see THE PENAL
CODE OF FRANCE art. 419 (Evans trans. 1819) (presenting full translation of Code
P~nal).
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however, the situation is quite different. Actually, in most
cases the "collective" interest is defined by the dominant com-
panies within the cartel. This narrow oligopoly, formed by the
few market leaders, obliges dominated companies to take part
in a game played by the oligopoly's rules, violation of which
exposes the weakest companies to retaliatory measures, sanc-
tions, and finally elimination from the market.
Prohibited cartels are, within the meaning of Article 85(1)
of the EEC Treaty, horizontal agreements, arrangements, con-
certed and anti-competitive practices between undertakings or
associations as well as decisions of associations that have as
their object of effect the modification of competitive conditions
in a degree sufficient to affect interstate trade.22 It cannot be
concluded that in certain circumstances the concept could be
applied to particular agreements between undertakings operat-
ing at different business levels, i.e., between suppliers and pro-
ducers or between producers and distributors. But vertical
agreements or concerted practices are not, in principle, seen as
cartel behavior even if obviously certain horizontal agreements
could impose restrictions and obligations on other vertical
businesses .23
In a common sense, a cartel is a group of competitors who
bind themselves to restrict their competitive freedom on the
market. However, for Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty to apply,
it is not necessary that the agreements be legally binding for
the members of the group or that they provide for penalties in
case of cheating. It is sufficient that the competitors reach a
consensus that restricts their individual industrial and com-
mercial freedom.
Cartels are often, but not always, conspiracies to restrain
free trade. A conspiracy is a coalition of two or more compa-
nies in order to accomplish an unlawful end by secret con-
certed means. If the means are made publicly known, the car-
tel is not a conspiracy, even if it is a restriction of competition
under Article 85(1). Furthermore, national or multinational
cartels are often implemented to preserve traditional home
22. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 85(1).
23. See, e.g. Publishers Assoc.-Net Book Agreements, O.J. L 22/12 (1989)
(showing that vertical restrictive agreements are permissible), on appeal, Re the Net
Book Agreements: Publishers Assoc. v. Commission, Case T-66/89, [1992] E.C.R.
-, [1992) 5 C.M.L.R. 120 (Ct. First Instance).
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markets against competition from other member states or, col-
lectively, against competition from third countries.
Elaborating on a theoretical cartel definition is not of
great interest. It is more useful to analyze, from a competition
point of view, the behavior of cartel members and the restric-
tive practices in which they might engage themselves, as well as
to classify cartels according to their form or their object.
A. Classification According to the Form of the Cartel
The only way to classify cartels according to their form is
to distinguish between those that are based on formal publicly
known or secret agreements and those that are based on tacit
agreements and express themselves only through a concerted
practice.
1. Cartels Based on an Agreement Between Two or
More Companies
These cartels are the result of an agreement between a
number of companies, the terms of which are clearly defined
and have been the object of negotiations between the mem-
bers. In most cases they consist of a central structure en-
trusted with the organization and day-to-day management of
the cartel as well as with the control of discipline and the ex-
change of information necessary for the functioning of the car-
tel.
a. Institutional Cartels
This category involves essentially publicly known cartels
that openly assume both their statute as well as the object of
their activities. In fact, these cartels often notify the Commis-
sion particularly when they claim to pursue objectives which
are not directly anti-competitive. When the object of such a
cartel can have a restrictive effect on competition, its operators
advance arguments demonstrating pro-competitive effects that
compensate or balance negative effects.
Especially when the cartel is publicly known, its central
structure takes the form of a professional association for the
defense of the interests of a profession, for technical promo-
tion, or for the improvement of services to the consumer. As-
sociations of this kind are primarily entrusted with the repre-
CARTELS: PROOF AND PROCEDURE
sentation of corporate interests of their members to public au-
thorities, and as such they escape most of the time from the
application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
It is certain that decisions of professional associations of
this type can lead to the creation of cartels directly infringing
competition rules. However, simple recommendations or sug-
gestions of professional organizations cannot be qualified as
decisions, even if in practice they can be useful as a starting
point in a formal collective agreement or a simple concerted
practice (de facto cartel). Several associations can also con-
clude cartel agreements between them. Such cartels, however,
fall within the scope of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 4
An institutional cartel of this type was set up in 1963 in the
building and construction industry in the Netherlands by the
SP0 25 having as its object "to promote and administer orderly
competition, to prevent improper conduct in price tendering
and to promote the formation of economically justified
prices. ' ' 26 The SPO, members of which are twenty-seven as-
sociations and one foundation regrouping more than 4000
building and construction firms established in the Netherlands,
notified the Commission of its "Uniform Price-regulating
Rules" ("UPR") and the corresponding "Code of Honour"
and requested a negative clearance or an exemption. Accord-
ing to the SPO, the cartel was necessary in order to avoid ruin-
ous price competition in a specific and quite difficult market.
In its decision 27 the Commission considered that the SPO rules
and decisions were infringing Article 85(1) because they pro-
vided for exchanges of information prior to tendering proce-
dures, involved concerted action for the fixing of selling prices
and other trading conditions and shared between members the
demand side of the market. 8 Consequently members of the
SPO were fined and requested to put an end to the cartel im-
mediately.29
24. Chauffage Central ("Central Heating"), O.J. L 264/22 (1972).
25. SPO, the "Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organizaties in
de Bouwnijverheid," is an association of cooperating organizations for the regulation
of prices in the construction industry. See Building and construction industry in the
Netherlands, O.J. L 92/1, at 2 (1992) (commenting on SPO's price agreement).
26. Id. at 3 (quoting article three of statutes of the SPO).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 11-28.
29. Id. at 29.
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The SPO applied to the CFI to annul the decision. An
interim measures request to suspend the decision was also sub-
mitted. Ruling on this request, the President of the CFI re-
fused for all practical purposes to suspend the decision of the
Commission.3 ° He stated that the majority of the restrictive
elements identified therein were clearly anti-competitive and
ordered the SPO members to put an end to the infringement
before October 1992. Nevertheless, he allowed those SPO
rules which do not clearly restrict competition to continue to
apply ad interim, on the condition that the functioning of the
system would be ensured exclusively by the SPO bureau and
its president with the exclusion of any contact or concertation
between competing undertakings.
An equally elaborate form of organic cartel consists in cre,
ating a joint company for market research or marketing pur-
poses that serves as a cover and is entrusted usually with the
accomplishment of certain tasks of a commercial nature for the
account of its members. There is also the case of joint sales
agencies3' or of cartels which, without going as far as the crea-
tion of a joint company, are equipped with management, ad-
ministrative, or accounting bodies.3 2 Participation in such
structures is obligatory for the members. Financing is assured
through contributions of the member companies. It is not un-
usual, particularly in market sharing cartels, for the contribu-
tions of its members to correspond to the market share allo-
cated to them.
b. Secret Cartels
In contrast, secret cartels, even if they are based on formal
agreements, do not generally dispose of elaborate organic
structures. They are mainly characterized by meetings at the
top executive level of the participating companies ("Meetings
of Head Delegates," "Meetings of'Top Country Representa-
tives," etc.) held discretely in exotic locations without written
30. Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organizaties in de Bouwn-
ijverheid v. Commission, Case T-29/92R (Ct. First Instance July 16, 1992) (not yet
reported).
31. Central Stikstof Verkoopkantoor BV ("CSV"), O.J. L 242/15, at 18-22
(1978).
32. See, e.g., Italian cast glass, O.J. L 383/19,.at 21-23 (1980) (describing role of
FIDES in facilitating cartel by maintaining price lists and business statistics).
CARTELS: PROOF AND PROCEDURE
agendas Or minutes. Sometimes such meetings are held paral-
lel to or on the occasion of the official meetings of the profes-
sional association to which the members belong. The main de-
fense of such cartels against action by antitrust authorities is
precisely the absence of documentary evidence. Following the
basic agreement between, delegates in a secret meeting, details
concerning its application and its practical adaptation to the
changing market conditions are mostly taken care of by tele-
phone.
2. Cartels Based on Concerted Practices (De Facto Cartels)
A formal agreement, however, is not 'necessary for the
existence of a cartel within the meaning of Article 85. Even in
the absence of such an agreement, a cartel exists if a number of
companies adapt their commercial strategy or their general be-
havior to the behavior of each other without having a valid eco-
nomic reason to do so. Collusion is prohibited in the absence
of a plausible economic justification for such behavior. It is
not necessary that the companies involved work out an actual
plan regulating every aspect of the cartel.3 3
The concept of a cartel based on a concerted practice is an
extremely complicated one. It usually involves circumstantial
evidence corroborated by economic evidence. The Court of
Justices4 defines the concerted practice as
a form of co-ordination between undertakings, which, with-
out having been taken to the stage where an agreement
properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly 35 substi-
tutes for the risks of competition, practical cooperation be-
tween them which leads to conditions of competition which
do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market,
having regard to the nature of the products, the importance
and number of the undertakings as well as the size and na-
ture of the said market. Such practical cooperation
amounts to a concerted practice, particularly if it enables
the persons concerned to consolidate established positions
33. See, e.g., LdPE, OJ. L 74/21, at 33 (1989); PVC, OJ. L 74/1, at 12 (1989); see
RICHARD WHIsH, COMPETITION LAw 223 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing plausible eco-
nomic justifications for such collusive plans).
34. Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-
48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113'& 114/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, 1916,. 26-27, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 295, 348 [hereinafter Suiker Unie].
35. "Id. -(emphasis added).
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to the detriment of effective freedom of movement of the
products in the common market and of the freedom of con-
sumers to choose their suppliers.3 6
It is certainly a quite complex definition, but its key ele-
ment is the term "knowingly," employed by the Court of Jus-
tice in order to make clear that the companies accused of collu-
sion should at least be conscious of the possible anti-competi-
tive effects of their conduct. Contacts between the companies
involved are often a key element in the process of establishing
evidence against such cartels.
B. Classification According to the Object of the Cartel
This classification is less useful within the framework of a
discussion of problems of evidence. It must be stressed that
the basic questions regarding what must be proved and how it
must be proved remain practically unchanged from one cartel
category to another. Although the following general catego-
ries can be observed in dealing with cartels, combinations of
two or more categories are common.
1. Commercialization Cartels
Commercialization cartels involve cartels which aim at or-
ganizing jointly the conditions for the commercialization of
goods or services. These are commonly price fixing cartels, 7
cartels that divide the market between their members either
geographically3" or according to categories of customers,"
36. Id. at 1916, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 348.
37. See, e.g., Roofing felt, O.J. L 232/15, at 17-23 (1986) (including price fixing,
quotas, and import boycotts), on appeal, S.C. Belasco v. Commission, Case 246/86,
[1989] E.C.R. 2117, 2186, 15 [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 96, 121; Flat glass, O.J. L 33/44
(1989) (including price fixing and production quotas), on appeal, Flat Glass, Joined
Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance);
PVC, O.J. L 74/1 (1989) (including price fixing, production quotas, and information
exchange), on appeal, PVC, Joined Cases T-79, 84-86, 89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 &
104/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (Ct. First Instance); LdPE, Oj. L
74/21 (1989) (same); Polypropylene, O.J. L 230/1 (1986) (including price fixing ini-
tiatives and market sharing), on appeal, Re the Polypropylene Cartel: SA Hercules NV
v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84 (Ct. First In-
stance) [hereinafter Hercules].
38. See, e.g., Peroxygen products, O.J. L 35/1, at 4-6 (1985) (discussing market
sharing); International Quinine Agreement ("Quinine-I"), OJ. L 192/5 (1969) (in-
cluding market sharing, quotas, and price fixing), on appeal, ACF Chemiefarma NV v.
Commission, Case 41/69, [1970] E.C.R. 661, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Common
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cartels fixing other sales terms and conditions, 40 or cartels reg-
ulating advertising, 4 ' sales promotion, 42 or access to trade
fairs,"3 etc. Such cartels may also concern collusive tendering
by their members in public or private invitations to tender.4
Cartels falling in this category can also take the institution-
alized form ofjoint sales organizations. 45 This usually involves
the establishment of an agency having an official business
name and taking the shape of a trade association or a joint
commercial company."6 Such agencies regroup and distribute
customers' orders in the home market of their members47 and
sometimes themselves carry out commercial operations abroad
acting on behalf of the members. 8 Joint purchasing agencies
fall also under Article 85(1), because they can restrict sellers'
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8083; Soda-ash-Solvay, ICI, O.J. L 152/1, at 4-7 (1991) (discuss-
ing market sharing arrangements between Solvay and ICI); see also J.A. VAN DAMME,
LA POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE DANS LA CEE 507-17 (1980).
39. See Agreements and concerted practices in the flat-glass sector in the
Benelux countries, OJ. L 212/13, at 14-15 (1984); Flat glass, O.J. L 33/44 (1989)
(differentiating customers accordingto types of glass producers, especially automo-
tive glass); see also LENNART RITTER, ET AL., EEC COMPETITION LAw: A PRACTI-
TIONER'S GUIDE 154-55 nn.214-15 (1991) (citing further cases involving customer
categorization).
40. Papiers peints de Belgique ("Belgian Wallpaper"), OJ. L 237/3 (1974), on
appeal, Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Commission,
Case 73/74, [1975] E.C.R. 1491, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 589; Vimpoltu, 0.J. L 200/44, at
46-48 (1983) (fixing export sale terms).
41. See Milchf6rderungsfonds ("Milk Promotion Fund"), 0.J. L 35/35 (1985)
(discussing fixed advertising rates for members of milk producers association).
42. Vimpoltu, O.J. L 200/44, at 47 (1983).
43. See British Dental Trade Association-BDTA, 0.J. L 233/15 (1988) (restrict-
ing access to British Dental Association trade shows where major sales take place).
44. See Building and construction industry in the Netherlands, O.J. L 92/1
(1992) (condemning collusive tendering). But see FIEC/CEETB, 0J. C 52/2 (1988)
(commission notice allowing standardized tender offers); COMMISSION EIGHTEENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 60 (1989) (commenting that Commission ap-
proved FIEC/CEETB agreement).
45. See, e.g., Floral, 0.J. L 39/51 (1980); Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor BV
("CSV"), 0.J. L 242/15 (1978); Nederlandse Cement-Handelsmaatschappij NV
("NCH"), 0J. L 22/16 (1972); Cementregeling voor Nederland ("CRN"), OJ. L
303/7 (1972).
46. See, e.g., SA Binon & Cie v. SA Agence et Messageries de la Presse, Case
243/83, [1985] E.C.R. 2015, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 800 (forming such common agency
to distribute Belgian newspapers); Socit Commerciale des Potasses et de l'Azote
(SCPA)-Kali und Salz (formerly VDK), 0.J. L 217/3 (1973); Wood Pulp, 0.J. L 85/
1 (1985).
47. Centraal StikstofVerkoopkantoor BV ("CSV"), OJ. L 242/15 (1978).
48. Floral, O.J. L 39/51, at 52 (1980).
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access to the market, but are usually exempted -under Article
85(3) if they obtain lower prices or. better conditions. 49 They
must not, however, impose any unnecessary or excessive re-
strictions or limitations upon their members. 50
2. Output Controlling Cartels
Such cartels are supposed to respond to specific situations
of production Overcapacity and artificially achieve conditions
of market stability.5' They are'designed to safeguard existing
business levels under falling demand. 52 Often these agree-
ments are entered into by companies in order to reinforce the
implementation of a price fixing agreement. Indeed, 'as soon
as the existence of production overcapacities due to structural
problems or to the general economic situation becomes known
to the purchasers of the goods or services involved, it gives
them a bargaining advantage' over suppliers which may enable
them to break the price fixing arrangements of the cartel. To
keep price levels high, output must be reduced by means of
agreements to close' down production facilities, by collectively
agreed investments, and by producer-to-producer sales or
compensations.5" These cartels often combine quotas, geo-
graphical market or customer sharing, price fixing, and infor-
mation exchange practices.
3. Crisis Cartels
Crisis cartels are in fact a variation of the previous cate-
gory. However, they apply only to clearly established situa-
49. COMMISSION FIRST REPORT ON. COMPETITION POLICY 40-41 (1972) (com-
menting on joint purchasing agreements); CoMMISSION NINTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 89 (1980).
50. See National Sulphuric Acid Assoc., O.J. L 260/24 (1980) (granting such an
exemption); National Sulphuric Acid Assoc., O.J. L 190/22 (1989) (extending ex-
emption).
51. See Soda-ash-Solvay, CFK, OJ. L 152/16 (1991) (agreeing to guarantee
minimum production tonnage to competitor to create aura of market stability).
52. ROBERT MERKIN & KAREN WILLIAMS, COMPETITION LAw: ANTITRUST POLICY
IN THE UK AND THE EEC 80-120 (1984) (discussing justification of restrictive agree-
ments).
53. See, e.g., Rolled zinc products and zinc alloys, O.J. L 362/40 (1982), on ap-
peal, Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA and Rheinzink GmbH v. Commis-
sion, Joined Cases 29 & 30/83, [19841 E.C.R. 1679, [19851 1 C.M.L.R. 688 (describ-
ing reciprocal investment strategies and provision of emergency supplies to competi-
tors to restrict competition).
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tions of durable and structural production overcapacity, which
they try to limit by means of concerted investment and produc-
tion rationalization plans.54 Structural overcapacity exists
where, over a prolonged period of time, all the undertakings
concerned have experienced a significant reduction in their
rates of capacity utilization, a drop of output accompanied by
substantial operating losses and where the information avail-
able does not indicate that any lasting improvement of the situ-
ation can be expected in the medium term.55
In such cases, companies belonging to the sector con-
cerned are often tempted to conclude between them agree-
ments that restrict competition in order to reduce the existing
structural overcapacities collectively. The Commission accepts
the possibility to create such crisis cartels under the condition
that they are established for a limited and well-defined period
of time and that they do not contain any excessive or inappro-
priate restrictions such as price fixing or geographical market
sharing. Further, they should not just limit production while
maintaining the existing capacities.56
4. Information Exchange Cartels
The exchange of individualized market data or other sen-
sitive commercial information between competitors constitutes
a cartel activity falling under Article 85. Thus, in Vegetable
54. See COMMISSION EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 42 (1979) (con-
cerning man-made fibers markets).
55. COMMISSION TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 38-41 (1982).
56. Id. 39; see COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 58
(1983) (describing zinc industry shutdown agreement providing for voluntary capac-
ity cuts).
57. See Zinc producer group, O.J. L 220/27 (1984). (sharing information on in-
vestment plans); Agreements and concerted practices of the flat-glass sector of the
Benelux countries, O.J. L 212/13 (1984) (sharing information on output and sales
figures of individual firms); Italian cast glass, O.J. L 383/19 (1980) (exchanging confi-
dential information of commercial nature); Bundesverband Deutscher Stahlhandel
eV ("BDS"), O.J. L 62/28 (1980) (sharing information on prices); COBELPA/VNP,
O.J. L 242/10 (1977) (sharing information on prices and general sales conditions);
Agreements between manufacturers of glass containers ("IFTRA"), OJ. L 160/1
(1974) (sharing information on price lists, rebates, general sales conditions, etc.);
Socit4 Commerciale des Potasses et de l'Azote (SCPA)-Kali und Salz, O.J. L 217/3
(1973) (exchanging information on stocks, current production" outstanding orders,
etc.); Cimbel, O.J. L 303/24 (1972) (providing information on projected increases in
industrial capacity).
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parchment,-8 the Commission considered that the main Euro-
pean producers of this product had, within the framework of
an international professional association, the Genuine Vegeta-
ble Parchment Association (the "GVPA"), developed a system
for the periodic exchange of information concerning price
levels and quantities of vegetable parchment exported by each
member individually to various markets outside the EEC. In
another decision, Fatty Acids, 59 the Commission also con-
demned members of a cartel for the exchange of information
concerning individual and normally confidential data of the
companies involved.
5. Import-Export Cartels
Cartels regulating imports or exports of goods or services
within the EEC (from one Member State to another) are nor-
mally treated as geographical market sharing cartels and fall
under Article 85(1). They are often established as joint sales
agencies or associations entrusted with the implementation of
marketing agreements concerning the exportation of goods to
EEC markets. 60 Although limited initially to the examination
of cartels for exports within the Community, later the Commis-
sion also started examining the effects on the internal market
of commercialization cartels organizing exports to all destina-
tions (EEC and third countries) or even exports to third coun-
tries only (indirect effect).61
It is clear that even when import/export cartels concern
commercial exchanges between the Community and third
countries,62 they are caught by Community antitrust rules.
This is particularly true for agreements that regulate imports
58. Vegetable parchment, OJ. L 70/54 (1978).
59. Fatty Acids, O.J. L 3/17 (1986).
60. See Floral, O.J. L 39/51 (1980) (describing such joint sales agency in ferti-
lizer market); Industrieverband Solnhofener Natursteinplatten Ev, O.J. L 318/32
(1980) (same).
61. See A. Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 60 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 571, 577 (1992) (commenting that the jurisdiction predicates of Article
85(1) of effects on Common Market and interstate trade are not met by export car-
tel). "Pure export cartels" having no effects within the Community, however, would
seem indeed outside the scope of Article 85(1). Id.
62. Commission's Opinion on self-limitation agreements curtailing imports
from Japan, O.J. C 111/13 (1972); COMMISSION SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 17 (1973) (describing self-limitation importation agreements).
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or exports in order to protect national markets. 63 Cartels fix-
ing conditions or prices of imports4 into the EEC have often
been prohibited. Export cartels are prohibited only if they
have important anti-competitive repercussions in the internal
EEC market. 65 Cartels concerned only with the transportation
of exported goods can also fall under consideration of Article
85 of the EEC Treaty, if they eliminate or restrict in practice
the freedom of the exporting company as regards the choice of
the transporter or if they fix the transport prices or other con-
ditions.66
II. EVIDENCE
The Sherman Antitrust Act in the United States de-
nounces "contracts, combinations or conspiracies" restricting
free trade.6 7 Does this mean that only explicit agreements to
restrain trade are unlawful? Can the enforcing authority
demonstrate the existence of a "combination" or a "conspir-
acy" without reporting evidence of an explicit agreement? In
theory, EEC competition rules raise fewer problems insofar as
Article 85 aims expressly at both agreements between compa-
nies as well as concerted practices.
As it has been stated above, the definition of the cartel
does not necessarily involve the existence of a formal agree-
ment. However, in the absence of any written or otherwise for-
mal element making it possible to materialize the existence of
an agreement, albeit an implicit one, the supervisory authority
is reduced to try to establish purely economic evidence. The
conclusive force of such a demonstration remains uncertain.
63. See Matsushita, supra note 6, at 189. Such cartels are often a response to the
existence of a corresponding cartel in the third country. In Japan, for instance, im-
port cartels can be exempted under the Transactions Law if an export cartel exists in
the country of origin. Id.
64. See, e.g., Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe, O.J. L 92/1 (1985); Wood
Pulp, O.J. L 85/1 (1985); Preserved mushrooms, O.J. L 29/26 (1975) (holding that
measures restricting Taiwanese mushrooms imports violates Article 85(1)); Franco-
Japanese ball bearings agreement, O.J. L 343/19, at 23-24 (1974) (holding that these
import restricting measures violate Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty).
65. CSV, O.J. L 242/15, at 26-34 (1978); European sugar industry, O.J. L 140/
17, at 37 (1973), on appeal, Suiker Unie, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 &
114/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
66. See COMMISSION NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY $ 84 (1980) (dis-
cussing applicability of article 85(1) in such conditions).
67. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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In a situation of tight oligopoly, where few producers oc-
cupy equivalent market shares, if one of the producers in-
creases its prices, it normally hopes that its competitors will
adopt an identical behavior, because it is reasonable to con-
sider that all have a common interest in increasing their prices.
Similarly, if one of the producers decides not to increase pro-
duction despite an increase in demand and observes that com-
petitors act similarly, the producer can reasonably enough con-
sider that this behavior is not due to a formal agreement be-
tween the companies involved but solely to the recognition by
competitors of a well understood mutual interest. According
to some commentators "a conspiracy doubtless entails agree-
ment, and 'contract' in restraint of trade a writing, but a combi-
nation can be anything involving two actors, neither the word
nor its legislative history demands agreement. '6
In fact, in Community antitrust law the incrimination is es-
sentially based on written evidence of the voluntary co-ordina-
tion of the behavior of the parties to the cartel. It is therefore
not of capital importance whether the agreement is concluded
in a contractual form or in the form of a simple explicit or tacit
commitment leading to the implementation of a concerted
practice. The essential element concerns the ability of the su-
pervisory authority to prove the existence of a joint desire to
restrict competition, whatever the form of expression of this
intention might be.
Evidence regarding the existence of a cartel, both docu-
mentary evidence as well as economic evidence, has to be
clearly distinguished from the evidence that the cartel is pri-
marily concerned with or has as its main purpose the restric-
tion of competition. Such evidence will be all the more neces-
sary if the acknowledged object of the cartel is more or less
harmless from a competition point of view, or at least bears no
direct relation to the conditions of competition which have to
prevail in a free market. On the contrary, evidence of the anti-
competitive intentions behind the cartel will be less essential
when the established object of 'the cartel consists in fixing
prices, market shares, or sales conditions.
Regarding the burden of proof in antitrust cases before
68. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 307 (2d ed. 1981).
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the European courts, it is generally admitted that the company
seeking the annulment of the Commission's decision (the ap-
plicant) must first furnish proof in support of its application.
In doing so, it is enough to prove that the Commission's deci-
sion is based upon insufficient evidence or that the conclusions
of the Commission based upon such evidence are unsound. It
belongs then to the Commission (the defendant) to discharge
the evidential burden of its allegations in the contested deci-
69sion.
A. Evidence of the Existence of a Cartel
1. Publicly Known Cartels
Publicly known cartels are in most cases presented as
agreements between companies or associations, association
decisions, or joint ventures. Their common feature is their of-
ficial character which leads their members to proceed to a noti-
fication under Articles 2 and 4 of Council Regulation No. 17/
62 in order to obtain an ,exemption under Article 85(3) of the
EEC Treaty or even a negative clearance. 70 Formal agree-
ments between companies may also be used in specific cases of
temporary cartels, such as the crisis cartels. Evidence of the
existence of "official" cartels poses no specific problems be-
cause of the formal notification of the agreement itself which
automatically establishes their existence.
2. Secret Cartels
Secret cartels originate either from an equally secret
agreement or from a simple concerted practice.
a. Cartels Resulting from an Agreement
An agreement between undertakings or a decision of an
association is defined as an act of collective will emanating
from the competent administrative bodies of the group and be-
69. See generally Mark Brealey, The Burden of Proof Before the European Court, 10
EUR. L. REV. 250 (1985) (discussing shifting burdens of proof in such cases before
European courts). -.70. See, e.g., Building and construction industry in the Netherlands, Oj. L 92/1
(1992); Publishers Assoc.-Net Book Agreements, O.J. L 22/12 (1989) (containing
such an application for a clearance of restrictive agreement). Council Regulation No.
17/62 allows for such an application for an exemption. Council Regulation No. 17/
62, supra note 9, Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 87.
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ing therefore obligatory for its members. It is not important
whether the group or the association has legal personality.
Further, it is not essential whether the association disposes of
statutes legally binding for its members. In fact, claims from
the association or its administration of legal personality or le-
gally binding statutes are mostly aimed at enabling it to obtain
from its members compliance with the cartel rules and mecha-
nisms through legal procedures provided for the enforcement
of civil obligations.
The agreement can take the shape of a de facto association
materialized by various acts-joint memoranda, exchange of
correspondence, facsimiles, etc.-reflecting the existence of a
common will. In International Quinine Agreement, 71 the Commis-
sion considered that gentlemen's agreements as well as agree-
ments concluded at joint meetings or by exchanging letters
constituted agreements between companies within the mean-
ing of Article 86. In the Fedetab recommendation case, 72 the Com-
mission also stated that a simple recommendation emanating
from an association of companies constituted an agreement
between companies because it had been accepted and actually
implemented by the members.
In Heintz van Landewyck Sdrl v. Commission,73 the Court of
Justice, on October 29, 1980, stated in its judgment that "a
recommendation made by an association of undertakings and
constituting a faithful expression of the members' intention to
conduct themselves compulsorily on the market in conformity
with the terms of the recommendation fulfills the necessary
conditions for the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty, '"' particularly because the members of the association
applied this recommendation accurately for several years. In
addition, the Commission considered in its decisions that the
internal statutes and regulations of the stock exchanges estab-
lished in London constituted agreements between companies
within the meaning of Article 85(1). 7' Therefore, if the cartel
71. International Quinine Agreement ("Quinine-I"), O.J. L 192/5 (1969).
72. Fedetab recommendation, O.J. L 224/29 (1978).
73. Joined Cases 209-215 & 218/78, [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R.
134.
74. Id. at 3127, 9 (quoting introduction in Court ofJustice reporter).
75. London Sugar Futures Mkt. Ltd., O.J. L 369/25 (1985); London Cocoa Ter-
minal Mkt. Assoc., O.J. L 369/28 (1985); Coffee Terminal Mkt. Assoc. of London
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results from an agreement between companies, the Commis-
sion must first provide some evidence establishing the exist-
ence of this agreement whatever the form might be of the act
expressing the collective will of the companies that took part in
this agreement.
b. Cartels Resulting from a Concerted Practice
In the Second Report on Competition Policy, it was already
pointed out that the restrictions of competition frequently
were taking more and more discreet forms of coordination of
the competitive behavior of the undertakings in the relevant
markets. 76 This applies to a significant number of secret car-
tels that do not originate from a specific legal act but only take
the form of a "concerted practice" which in most of the cases
makes itself visible in the way the parties to this concerted ac-
tion behave in the market. Most difficulties in establishing evi-
dence of the existence of a cartel given birth under such cir-
cumstances originate in reality from the fact that, although a
concerted practice can manifest itself in the form of a simple
succession of commercial actions or of a certain behavior
showing that the economic operator does not determine its in-
dustrial or commercial policy in an autonomous manner, this
"parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a con-
certed practice."' 77 However, "it may amount to strong evi-
dence of such a practice, if it leads to conditions of competition
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the mar-
Ltd., O.J. L 369/31 (1985); London Rubber Terminal Mkt. Assoc., O.J. L 369/34
(1985) ("Terminal Markets-I") (containing four decisions regarding the sugar, cocoa,
coffee, and rubber markets).
76. COMMISSION SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 139-61 (1973).
77. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Commission, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557 [hereinafter ICI]. Other dye manufacturing companies were
involved and had similar decisions applied to them. BASF AG v. Commission, Case
49/69, [1972] E.C.R. 713, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Bayer AG v. Commission, Case 51/
69, [1972] E.C.R. 745, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557;J.R. Geigy AG v. Commission, Case 52/
69, [1972] E.C.R. 787, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Sandoz AG v. Commission, Case 53/69,
[1972] E.C.R. 845, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557; SA Fran~aise des Matires Colorantes
(Francolor) v. Commission, Case 54/69, [1972] E.C.R. 851, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557;
Cassella Farbwerke Mainkur AG v. Commission, Case 55/69, [1972] E.C.R. 887,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case 56/69, [1972] E.C.R. 927,
[1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Azienda Colori Nazionali-ACNA SpA v. Commission, Case
57/69, [1972] E.C.R. 933, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557. Collectively, these are often re-
ferred to as the "Dyestuffs" cases.
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ket." 78
In addition to the parallel behavior of the companies in-
volved in the market, the Commission has to prove the exist-
ence of an intentional element behind this behavior, i.e., a col-
lective will to restrict competition that inspires the concerted
practice. From the point of view of the evidence that is abso-
lutely necessary before any intervention of the enforcing au-
thority may be considered possible, it must therefore be admit-
ted that, while the demonstration of parallel behavior involves,
on a first level only, the simple establishment of a number of
facts in the economic context of the case in question, the estab-
lishment of evidence regarding the existence of a joint inten-
tion of the companies concerned to act in collusion in order to
restrict competition raises much more complex problems.
According to section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
simple adoption of a common stance in the market by several
companies which find themselves in a situation of oligopoly
constitutes in itself a cartel; it is not necessary to prove the
existence of a collective will to restrict competition behind the
identical or largely similar commercial attitude of the compa-
nies involved. Thus, according to U.S. case law, parallel be-
havior would constitute a strong indication of collusion or, in
other words, of the collective will involved in the concept of
"conspiracy. ' 79 On this particular point European antitrust
law is much more restrictive and requires proof of an addi-
tional element of intention which manifests itself at least in
case of direct or indirect contacts between the companies in-
volved having as their object the incriminated behavior. The
Court of Justice states in its Suiker Unie judgment that
the criteria of "coordination" and "cooperation"... must
be understood in the light of the concept inherent in the
provisions of the Treaty relating to competition that each
economic operator must determine independently the pol-
icy which he intends to adopt on the common market....
Although it is correct to say that this requirement of inde-
pendence does not deprive economic operators of the right
to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and antici-
78. ICI, [1972] E.C.R. at 620 (quoting introduction to ICI in Court of Justice
report).
79. See POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 68 (discussing formation of conspir-
acy in such antitrust casesunder U.S. case law).
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pated conduct of their competitors, it does however strictly
preclude any direct or indirect contact between such opera-
tors, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the
conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor
or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct
which they themselves have decided to adopt or contem-
plate adopting on the market.80
The CFI recently repeated this statement in its Polypropylene
judgments.8 '
Similarly, on July 14, 1981, the Court of Justice8 2 reaf-
firmed this approach and stated that it was important to con-
sider
whether between the banks conducting themselves in' like
manner there are contacts or, at least, exchanges of infor-
mation on the subject of. .. the rate of the charge actually
imposed for comparable transfers which have been carried
out or are planned for the future and whether, regard being
had to the conditions of the market in question, the rate of
charge uniformly imposed is no different from that which
would have resulted from the free play of competition."
Regulation No. 17/62 of the Council does not contain any in-
dication concerning the problem of evidence. 4 According to
the principles relating to evidence in the administrative law in
all Member States of the European Community and, further, to
the principles of Community law, of which the Court of Justice
ensures the respect, the public authority entrusted with bring-
ing forward the accusations against the members of a cartel
carries also the burden of the proof. The accused does not
have to prove his innocence. On the other hand, it belongs to
the companies confronted with the evidence of their culpability
to prove that this evidence is either insufficient or the conclu-
sions based upon it are unsound. 5 In other words, evidence
80. Suiker Unie, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111 & 113-114/73, [1975]
E.C.R. 1663, 1942, 173-74, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295, 425.
81. E.g., Shell Int'l Chem. Co. v. Commission, Case T-I 1/89, slip op. 300 (Ct.
First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported).
82. Zuichner v. Bayerische Vereinsbank AG, Case 172/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2021,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 313.
83. Id. at 2033, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. at 326.
84. See generally Julian M. Joshua, Proof in Contested EEC Competition Cases: A Com-
parison With the Rules of Evidence in Common Law, 12 EUR. L. REv. 315 (1987).
85. See Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn, SA Musique Diffusion
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of infringement of the rules of competition is valid until the
contrary is proved.
Although there is no doubt that the burden of the proof is
carried by the Commission, 6 it must be noted that rules on the
admissibility of evidence in competition cases are more lenient
than in penal cases. In Suiker Unie,8 7 certain applicants claimed
that the power to impose fines prevents the Commission, in
this matter of a "quasi-criminal" nature, from basing its accu-
sations on presumptive 8 evidence, arguing that the rule "in
dubio pro reo" should prevail. In his opinion, Advocate General
Mayras rejected this argument. He reminded that the proce-
dure before the Commission is administrative, not judicial, and
that fines are not criminal law sanctions.8 9 The procedure pro-
vided for in Regulation No. 17/62 is certainly adversarial but
remains nevertheless a purely administrative one. Thus the
Commission cannot be considered to be exercising any judicial
functions.
Furthermore, evidence of a concerted practice amounting
to a secret cartel results generally from circumstantial evidence
brought to light during the investigations of the Commission.
According to Advocate General Mayras, it is therefore the
combination of these presumptions-provided that they are
strong, precise and relevant-which more often than not
alone enables the existence of a concerted action corrobo-
rated by the actual conduct the undertakings concerned to
be proved, and it only remains for the Community judge to
determine, finally, whether the material produced as evi-
dence by the Commission is conclusive. 90
According to Sir Gordon Slynn in SA Musique Diffusion
Frangaise v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-103/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, 1931,
[1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 288-89.
86. WHIsH, supra note 33, at 223.
87. Suiker Unie, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111 & 113-114/73, [1975]
E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
88. JoHN D. HEYDON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 6 (1975). Circumstan-
tial evidence is defined as any fact relevant to the issue from which the existence of a
fact in issue may be inferred. Id. Inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence are
often stated in presumptive form. Id.
89. Opinion of Advocate General Mayras, Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, 2061,
[1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295, 323.
90. Id.
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Frangaise v. Commission 9t it is clearly permissible to rely on pre-
sumptions and inferences from the primary facts, and this may
be in large measure the crucial part of the assessment as to
whether a concerted practice has been adopted. The Advocate
General quotes at this point from Eastern States Retail Lumber
Ass'n v. United States92 which also accepts circumstantial evi-
dence of a conspiracy in view of the difficulty to prove it by
direct testimony.
Further, from the methodology employed by the CFI in its
Flat Glass judgment 93 in order to analyze and evaluate the find-
ings of fact and the evidence relied on by the Commission in
its decision, it results that the applicant who contests the con-
vincing force of a Commission's decision does not have to
show that this decision is erroneous; it is enough to demon-
strate that "it is not sufficiently proven, expressly or implic-
itly," 94 in other words that the alleged infringements are not
proved "to the requisite legal standard." 95
B. Evidence of the Restriction of Competition
The EEC Treaty prohibits agreements which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market. This prohibition con-
cerns a variety of commercial behaviors that pursue the same
objective: to modify the existing competitive situation. It is
clear that any conscious and active behavior of companies at-
tempting to modify in an artificial way the competitive environ-
ment in order to reap the benefits of an anti-competitive ar-
rangement and limit the risks of free competition violates the
antitrust rules of the EEC Treaty.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to prove the existence of a
cartel in order to prohibit it. Evidence that the cartel has as its
object of effect the restriction of competition must also be es-
tablished. The decisional practice of the Commission and the
91. Joined Cases 100-103/80, [1983] E.C.R 1825, 1930, [1983] C.M.L.R. 221,
288 (citing Opinion of Advocate General Mayras, Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. at 2113-
14, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 387-89).
92. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
93. Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance).
94. Id. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -, 223.
95. Id. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -, 275.
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case law of the Court of Justice show that in practice the evi-
dence of the restriction overlaps essentially with the evidence
of the existence of the cartel. If the existence of a cartel is suc-
cessfully proved, therefore, its restrictive object or effect is rel-
atively easy to demonstrate.
1. Evidence of Restriction Resulting from the Object
of the Cartel
In case of a publicly known or a secret cartel based on an
agreement between companies the existence of which is estab-
lished by direct documentary evidence (text of the agreement,
correspondence, minutes of meetings, etc.), evidence of the re-
striction of competition is sufficiently established because it re-
sults from the object of the cartel as it emerges from the avail-
able documents. If an "object" to restrain competition is evi-
dent, then the agreement itself constitutes a restraint of
competition "by its very nature ' 96 and evidence concerning
the effects of the agreement on the market is not necessary.97
According the Court of Justice in Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici
SpA v. Commission ("Sandoz-H"),98 "in such cases the absence in
the Commission's decision of any analysis of the effects of the
agreement from the point of view of competition does not con-
stitute a defect capable of justifying a declaration that it is
void."9 9 The Court added that the fact that no steps have been
taken to ensure the implementation of a restrictive agreement
is not sufficient to remove it from the prohibition of Article
85(1).100
The same applies also in the case of a cartel functioning
on the basis of a concerted practice having clearly as its object
to prevent, restrict, or distort competition, whatever the de-
gree of effective success of such a practice might be. Indeed,
the anti-competitive object of an agreement or a concerted
practice should be enough to prove that competition was at
96. RirrER, ET AL., supra note 39, at 71,
97. S.C. Belasco v. Commission, Case 246/86, [1989] E.C.R. 2117, 2186, 15,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 96, 121; Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v. Commission, Case
C-277/87, [1990] E.C.R. 45, 46, 3 [hereinafter Sandoz-II]; PVC, O.J. L 74/1, at 13,
37 (1989); LdPE, O.J. L 74/21, at 34, 44 (1989); Polypropylene, OJ. L 230/1, at
29, 90 (1986).
98. Sandoz-H, [1990] E.C.R. at 46, 3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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least liable to be restricted, even if the agreement or the con-
certed practice did not have any real effect on the market.' 0'
Nevertheless, a view is emerging according to which Arti-
cle 85(1) should not be considered violated when the means of
implementation (pricing arrangements, etc.) of a cartel agree-
ment are "objectively inapt" to restrict competition or modify
the competitive situation in a specific market or at a given
time."0 2 The CFI noted in its Polypropylene judgments that even
if the means of implementation of an agreement are not always
successful, if the agreement is apt to have any effect on compe-
tition, it must be considered having an anti-competitive ob-
ject.0 3 Indeed, it belongs to the incriminated companies to
prove, necessarily by means of a complex economic analysis,
that an agreement was inapt, even potentially, to restrict com-
petition and therefore it could not have an anti-competitive
"object." Such an assertion should be extremely difficult to
prove in the case of cartel agreements. 0 4
On the other hand, the object of the agreement should
not be confused with the intention of the parties to restrict
competition. It emerges clearly from the clauses of the agree-
ment objectively considered. All that remains to know is
whether the specific agreement could be reasonably expected
to restrict competition. However, if it is clearly established
that an agreement with an anti-competitive object infringes Ar-
ticle 85(1) of the EEC Treaty, even if this agreement is not put
into effect or if implementation measures were inadequate to
achieve the intended objective, a controversy remains concern-
ing concerted practices when the concertation was not fol-
lowed by any effect on the market. Admittedly, the apprecia-
tion of a concerted practice is somewhat different from that of
an agreement. If the concerted practice has already been im-
plemented by the companies involved, then the above consid-
101. Vereniging van Cementhandelaren ("VCH"), O.J. L 13/34 (1972).
102. See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-13/89, slip op.
1 273-88 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (analyzing arguments
concerning requirements of Article 85(1)).
103. Id. 293.
104. See Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, Case T-7/89,
[1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 164-67, § I.D.5 (Ct. First Instance). The
opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf states these views on Article 85(1) applica-
bility. Id.
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erations regarding anti-competitive agreements apply to it as
well.
On the contrary, the appreciation of a concerted practice
having clearly as its object the restriction of competition but
not followed by real effects on the market causes some
problems. Certain authors deny formally the possibility of
treating such a concerted practice in the same way an agree-
ment would be treated. 10 5 Because the concerted practice is,
by definition, only revealed and characterized at the moment
of its implementation, it can only be condemned when (and if)
it is implemented. Contrary to an agreement having an unlaw-
ful object, a concertation (e.g., meetings, exchange of informa-
tion, etc.) having an unlawful object should, in order to be
qualified as a concerted practice infringing Article 85(1), be
followed by de facto conduct connected to it by a causality link.
Incrimination in such a case should therefore depend upon ev-
idence of restrictions of competition resulting from the meas-
ures of implementation of the concerted practice in the market
in question.
In his opinion in the Polypropylene case'0 6 Judge Vesterdorf
took a similar approach arguing that, for Article 85 to apply,
some kind of action must be taken with the knowledge and the
awareness that it results from the concertation. If no action is
taken at all, perhaps because the company was forced to leave
the market, there is no infringement. According to Judge Ves-
terdorf, the Commission must prove not only the concertation
but also subsequent conduct on the market pursued in the
knowledge ensuing from the concertation. It is not necessary
to prove specifically individual, casually related acts. On the
other hand, the undertakings involved should prove that the
knowledge obtained from the concertation was not used in the
determination of the undertakings policy. The CFI, however,
does not seem to follow this interpretation. In its Shell/
Polypropylene judgment1 0 7 it repeats the definition of the Court
105. See id. at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 153-57, § I.D.3(g) (presenting overview
of commentators Joliet, J.A. Van Damme, Schapira/Le Tallet/Blaise, Goldman,
Piriou, E. Colmant, Van Gerven, Schr6ter, Koch, Bellamy/Child, Kovar, Druesne,
and Deringer on problem).
106. Id. at -, [1992] C.M.L.R. at 157-62, § I.D.3(i).
107. Shell Int'l Chem. Co. v. Commission, Case T-I 1/89, slip op. 300-03 (Ct.
First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); see infra note 148 and accompanying
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of Justice in the Suiker Unie case' and stresses that, in deter-
mining their subsequent policies, parties to a concertation
"could not fail to take into account, directly or indirectly," the,
information disclosed during the concertation about the
course of conduct which other participants had decided to
adopt or contemplated adopting on the market. One can rea-
sonably conclude from this judgment that, at least in the case
of long-lasting cartels, a concertation with anti-competitive ob-
ject is presumed to give rise to de facto concerted conduct on
the market. It belongs to the incriminated company to prove
either the complete absence of conduct or that its actual con-
duct was totally independent from the knowledge it acquired
during the concertation.
Further, it must be noted that reality is often more ambig-
uous. The dividing line between the agreement and the con-
certed practice is far from being always easy to draw with preci-
sion. This is why the Commission considers that, in the case of
certain cartels (particularly complicated and long-running ones
with numerous adherents, the existence of which is established
on the basis of circumstantial evidence relating to minutes of
meetings, exchange of correspondence, or internal notes, etc.),
collusion presents some of the elements of both forms of pro-
hibited cooperation." 9 In such cases the Commission is enti-
tled to find that the behavior of the incriminated companies
constitutes a single infringement qualified as agreement or at
least concerted practice without it being necessary to prove
each type of infringement separately." 0 Finally, it must be
stressed that in the case of a concerted practice, the anti-com-
petitive intention of the participants has to be inferred clearly
from their action on the market and from the background
against which the incriminated conduct took place.
text (discussing Court of First instance's partial acceptance of application for annul-
ments of decision).
108. Suiker Unie, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111 & 113-114/73, [1975]
E.C.R 1663, 1942, 173-74, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295, 425; see supra text accompany-
ing note 80 (quoting this definition).
109. E.g., PVC, O.J. L 74/1 (1989); LdPE, O.J. L 74/21 (1989); Flat glass, O.J. L
33/44 (1989); Polypropylene, O.J. L 230/1 (1986).
110. See Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, Cases T-7/89,
[1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 167, § I.D.6 (Ct. First Instance); Shell Int'l
Chem. Co. v. Commission, Case T-1 1/89, slip op. 304-05 (Ct. First Instance Mar.
10, 1992).
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2. Evidence Resulting from the Effects of the Cartel
When it is demonstrated that several companies had delib-
erately implemented a concerted practice of an industrial,
commercial, or economic nature without explicitly stating an
anti-competitive objective, the evidence of its restrictive effects
on competition should be established by the precise analysis of
the circumstances and the impact of the behavior on the mar-
ket. These effects may be currently observed or they may be
potential or future effects, if the practice in question is still
only in the initial phases of its implementation.
The Court of Justice stated in its judgment of June 30,
1966 in Sociit6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH i..
that it may be necessary, in case of doubt about the interpreta-
tion of the object of an agreement, to examine whether compe-
tition was in fact prevented, restricted, or distorted in an ap-
preciable measure."i 2 To simplify the approach of the Com-
mission, it can be said that in the absence of direct
documentary evidence against a cartel having an anti-competi-
tive object, priority will be given to the demonstration of its
restrictive effects on the market. In other words, this involves
determining whether or not, taking into consideration the
characteristics of the market and the diverging interests of
each individual firm involved, the behavior of companies active
in this market corresponds to what it is considered reasonable
by the economic theory, presuming that each company takes
its decisions and determines its policies independently from
the others.
Nevertheless, if the effects of a concerted practice or of
parallel behavior are clearly anti-competitive, evidence of a
causality link between suspect behavior and the restriction of
competition in the market must be established, even if such a
link can be demonstrated by logical deduction. Thus, a uni-
form price level or simultaneous price increases by several
firms can be the logical result of undistorted competition or,
on the contrary, they can be the consequence of cooperation
without which prices and price increases would have been dif-
ferent. In fact, establishing the evidence of a restriction of
competition through the effects of a specific agreement or con-
111. Case. 56/65, [19661 E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
112. Id. at 249, [1966] C.M.L.R. at 375.
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certed practice on the market presupposes that economic evi-
dence has already been successfully established. This can only
be achieved by means of a detailed analysis of the market in
question and particularly of its most significant aspects from
the point of view of competition: degree of concentration of
the sector, price levels in the long term, upward/downward
movements of prices, accessory sales conditions (transport
costs, collective rebate schemes, "basic point" systems, etc.),
limitation of production capacities and investments, lists of ap-
proved customers, etc.
C. Types of Evidence Used
The nature of evidence that is necessary and sufficient to
prove charges against a secret cartel constitutes a central issue
in the procedure for the incrimination of companies involved
in such restrictive practices. Evidence likely to be used by the
Commission can be divided in. the following categories: direct
documentary evidence, circumstantial evidence, and economic
evidence. Use of testimony evidence is limited in the EEC anti-
trust procedures.
1. Direct Documentary Evidence
Cartels involving a large number of companies and estab-
lishing complex price fixing and market sharing mechanisms,
lead in most cases to the development of equally complex or-
ganization and control structures. In such cases it appears nec-
essary for the cartel members to determine rules of conduct in
detailed documents, keep minutes of meetings 'and reports or
working papers on the implementation of these rules both re-
garding the operation of the cartel on a daily basis as well as
the long term compliance of individual members with the
rules. Discovering, by means of appropriate investigations, let-
ters, telexes, internal notes, and reports establishing in a direct
way the evidence of cooperation seems therefore easier than in
the case of a cartel with few members and loose organization.
A document constitutes direct evidence in itself when it
allows the Commission to establish that precisely designated
companies (or persons in charge of these companies) con-
cluded an agreement with the intention to restrict competition.
This is the case, for example, with a memorandum on an
2991992-1993]
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agreement entered into by the participants, an exchange of let-
ters between members of the cartel relative to restrictive prac-
tices, minutes of meetings concerning these practices and au-
thenticated by the companies present to the meeting, etc.
Documents concerning third parties directly or indirectly in-
criminating them as participants in the cartel can either consti-
tute direct evidence against such parties, if they are sufficiently
clear and consistent, or corroborate and explain other direct
evidence supporting the incrimination in first place. Such doc-
uments must, nevertheless, be treated with care.' 3
Direct documentary evidence is increasingly rare and diffi-
cult to discover insofar as the decisional practice of the Com-
mission becomes stricter as regards secret horizontal cartels.
Certainly surprise inspections on the basis of Article 14(3) of
Regulation No. 17/62, performed simultaneously in the head
offices of several companies, have still shown their efficiency in
a recent past 1 4 and certain current procedures prove that one
must never despair to discover by such means direct evidence
of the infringement or, as some commentators call it in the
United States, the "smoking gun." Nevertheless, no legal text
or regulation specifies which kind of direct evidence has to be
considered sufficient in order to establish the existence of a
cartel. This makes it, therefore, essential to approach and
evaluate all available evidence in a pragmatic way.
In the Wood Pulp case" 5 the Commission relied on a large
number of direct evidence (internal notes, exchanges of let-
ters, and telexes) from which it resulted clearly that certain
companies were involved in the organization of various meet-
ings between 1973 and 1977 having as their object to fix prices
but also to determine disciplinary rules and retaliatory actions,
in order to compel companies not adhering to these prices to
justify or adapt their behavior. From the moment a document
is qualified by the Commission and accepted by the Court of
Justice as direct evidence of anti-competitive practices, compa-
nies incriminated in the Commission's decision against the se-
cret cartel can not contest it and try to "destroy" its validity in
113. C.S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 103 (2d ed, 1988) (stating that
inspectors must keep records and inventories of materials taken).
114. PVC, OJ. L 74/1 (1989); LdPE, OJ. L 74/21 (1989); Polypropylene, OJ. L
230/1 (1986).
115. Wood Pulp, OJ. L 85/1 (1985).
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court other than by proving before the Court of First Instance
that it is false or "made up" with the intention to mislead the
authorities and harm the company concerned or that it simply
reflects an erroneous point of view of its author. This is mostly
the case of certain minutes kept by someone present in a meet-
ing but contested later by the other participants in the same
meeting.
On the other hand, the absence of any written trace, re-
port, or internal note in the files of a company, which, accord-
ing to evidence found elsewhere, took part in one or more
meetings with competitors, can constitute a strong presump-
tion of the incriminating character of these meetings. Absence
of documentation in all companies having participated in a
meeting that undoubtedly took place can further be consid-
ered by the Commission as subsidiary evidence of the incrimi-
nating character of this meeting and be used to corroborate
other direct documentary evidence. 1 6
2. Circumstantial (Presumptive) Evidence
It is clear that while the best demonstration of the exist-
ence of a cartel is normally based on direct evidence regarding
its creation and implementation, accepting the idea that only
direct evidence should be admitted in such cases would allow
the majority of these cartels to remain active with total impu-
nity. In Europe, as well as in the United States, the concept of
evidence admissible against cartels had to be extended in or-
der to incorporate circumstantial evidence from which the pre-
sumption (disputable in court) of the existence of a cartel can
be inferred.
Indeed, direct evidence available in cartel cases concerns
frequently only certain findings of fact such as the precise rates
of price increases implemented by the companies involved as
well as the identity of these companies. But the fact of aligning
one's sales conditions based on the conditions practiced by a
competitor, often the price leader in the specific market, does
not constitute in itself evidence of concertation. It will be nec-
essary, therefore, to uncover other elements of proof or indica-
tions from which the existence of collusion may be inferred.
The implementation by several producers simultaneously of
116. Joshua, supra note 84, at 319.
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identical price increases covering an important number of dif-
ferent products makes it reasonable to presume that there ex-
ists an agreement behind these increases insofar as it appears
highly improbable that almost all competitors in the same mar-
ket act in an identical way at the same time.
The Court of Justice had the opportunity to fix the condi-
tions of admissibility of circumstantial evidence ' 7 in the July
14, 1972 Dyestuffs decisions, and in particular in the paragraphs
66-67 and 68.118 Paragraph 66 states first of all that
[a]lthough parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified
with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong
evidence of such a. practice if it leads to conditions of com-
petition which do not correspond to the normal conditions
of the market, having regard to the nature of the products,
the size and the number of the undertakings, and the vol-
ume of the said market. '" 9
These abnormal market conditions are observed, according to
paragraph 67, when
parallel conduct is such as to enable those concerned to at-
tempt to stabilize prices at a level different from that to
which competition would have led, and to consolidate es-
tablished positions to the detriment of effective freedom of
movement of the products in the Common Market and of
the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers.' 20
The above considerations of the Court of Justice lead to
the following conclusions: parallelism of behavior is only an
indication (albeit a serious one), but does not in itself consti-
tute evidence of cooperation. Furthermore, this indication can
only be, appreciated in the light of the anti-competitive objec-
tive that the parallel behavior is supposed to have sought. In
addition, the Court of Justice draws also in its paragraph 68 a
procedural conclusion of extreme importance for the anti-car-
tel policy of the Community: indications should not be appre-
ciated separately but in combination with each other. Accord-
ing to the Court ofJustice, "the question whether there was a
117. "Indizienbeweis" in German law, "preuve par presomption" in French law.
118. ICI, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, 655, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557, 622-23; see
supra note 77 (listing other cases constituting "Dyestuffs" decision).
119. ICI, [1972] E.C.R. at 655, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 622-23.
120. Id. at 655, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 623.
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concerted action in this case can only be correctly determined
if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is
considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being
taken of the specific features of the market in the products in
question."121
This relation between circumstantial and economic evi-
dence as well as the fact that the conduct of each company
must be evaluated in comparison both with the conduct of the
other competitors and with the market situation is evident in a
number of subsequent decisions of the Commission. Formu-
lating this principle in its decision in the Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment
case,' 22 the Commission concluded that the conduct of the un-
dertakings involved could not "be explained in a reasonable
way as being the consequence of normal business considera-
tions of contractual necessities" nor could "the conduct of
each of the undertakings be considered as isolated facts."'' 23
On the contrary, the conduct of each company involved in the
cartel constitutes an essential element and forms together with
the others a concerted practice. The Court of Justice essen-
tially confirmed this approach in its judgment on this case.' 24
This approach was further validated by the Court of Jus-
tice in the March 28, 1984 decision Compagnie Royale Asturienne
des Mines SA and Rheinzink GmbH v. Commission 125 which never-
theless imposed an important limitation on the value of cir-
cumstantial evidence considering that it cannot be conclusive
by itself, if a'plausible alternative explanation of the parallel
behavior could be found.' 26 This explanation is mostly fur-
nished by means of an economic analysis of the relevant mar-
ket that tends to demonstrate that a number of alternative de-
velopments could be considered "normal" in view of a given
market situation. Of course the old controversy surrounding
the analysis of what market conditions should be considered as
"normal" can not be quashed by a Court ofJustice decision. It
121. Id.
122. Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, O.J. L 60/21, at 34, 73 (1980).
123. Id.
124. SA Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-103/80,
[1983] E.C.R. 1825, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221.
125. Joined Cases 29, 30/83, [1984] E.C.R. 1679, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 688.
126. Id. at 1702, 16, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. at 711 (allowing applicants to give
reasons for their behavior other than concerted action).
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is obvious that such an approach involves a share of subjective
analysis based on a number of hypothetical constructions qual-
ified by some commentators as arbitrary to a certain extent. It
is in fact the responsibility of the administration at a political
level that is at stake in this case and the Court of Justice has
rarely taken the risk to challenge it. In other words, if market
conditions which command or result from the parallel behav-
ior are judged "normal," there will be no presumption of a
restriction of competition. On the contrary, if market condi-
tions are judged "abnormal," parallel behavior will not be re-
garded as spontaneous, but will necessarily result from prelim-
inary concerted action.
However, as Judge Ren6Joliet 127 stresses, it is by hypothe-
sis impossible to determine what the "normal" terms of com-
petition would be in the absence of the incriminated behavior.
Undoubtedly, this is the reason why the Court of Justice at-
tached in the ICI judgment more importance to the analysis of
the behavior of the companies involved than to that of the
price level. It is reasonable enough to conclude that what re-
ally mattered in this case was rather the indications of coopera-
tion between the incriminated companies reviewed as a whole
in the light of the specific characteristics of the market in ques-
tion, than the theoretical analysis of the normal market condi-
tions regarding price formation. It should nevertheless be
noted that, although both the Commission and the Court of
Justice examined principally all circumstantial evidence on the
parallel behavior of the dyestuffs producers, they did not at-
tach the same importance to the same elements of proof.
In its Matires Colorantes ("Dyestuffs") decision of July 24,
1969,121 the Commission put the accent on findings of "docu-
mentary" nature during its investigations: correspondence re-
garding instructions of price increases addressed to the distri-
bution subsidiaries which contained phrasing similarities, doc-
uments concerning meetings between producers, telexes, etc.
The Court ofJustice gave its preference to factual elements of
economic nature-identity of the price increase rates, of the
products concerned, of the national markets where the price
127. Ren6 Joliet, La Notion de Pratique Concertie et L 'arret I. C. L Dans Une Perspective
Comparative, 15 C.D. EUR. 251, 275 (1974).
128. J.O. L 195/11, at 12-14 (1969).
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increases were implemented-and concluded that it did not
appear "plausible" that increases introduced on national mar-
kets that have few common elements between them, i.e., Italy
and the countries of Northern Europe, as regards both price
levels and conditions of competition, could be carried out in
such a short period of time, i.e., within two to three days, with-
out some kind of preliminary coordination. 29 Furthermore, in
this judgment the Court ofJustice seems to attach more impor-
tance to taking into account the logic of the market in question
than to the material indications of collusion between produ-
cers.
However, in its Suiker Unie judgment of December 16,
1975,130 the Court ofJustice clearly applied again the principle
of circumstantial evidence regarding collusion and determined
the conditions that should be satisfied in order that the various
elements constituting the body of proof may be qualified as
evidence of the alleged cooperation of the incriminated com-
panies. In this case, the Commission had based its decision'
on the fact that cross-border deliveries between the Member
States were made almost exclusively from producer to pro-
ducer. This fact, which allowed the producers of importing
countries to preserve their acquired positions, could not be ex-
plained according to the Commission other than by the will-
ingness of all interested parties not to compete with each
other. The Commission inferred the evidence of cooperation
not only from a precise analysis of the statistical information
available on "controlled" deliveries between producers but
also from a multitude of documents (telexes, letters, reports,
internal notes, and minutes of meetings) revealing the exist-
ence of a concerted action between producers having as its ob-
ject to prohibit all "movements of goods from one country to
another other than those coordinated by the producers them-
selves."1 32
The Court of Justice stated in particular in paragraph 164
that "there is no reason why the Commission and the Court
129. ICI, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, 659, 107-10, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557,
626.
130. Suiker Unie, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111 & 113-114/73, [1975]
E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
131. European sugar industry ("Sugar"), O.J. L 140/17 (1973).
132. Id. at 23 (Author trans.).
1992-19931
306 FORDHA.MINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:266
should not accept as evidence of an undertaking's conduct cor-
respondence exchanged between third parties, provided that
the content thereof is credible to the extent to which it refers
to the said conduct" and required in paragraph 165, that "in
particular the statements in the documents in dispute tally with
the actual way the parties concerned have behaved on... [the]
market." 13 3 As far as evidence against cartels is concerned the
above considerations of the Court of Justice are very impor-
tant. Paragraph 164, which retains as evidence against a com-
pany correspondence between third parties, allows the field of
incriminating documents to be enlarged beyond the sphere of
direct evidence emanating from the party suspected of in-
fringement. 34
Further, in view of the Court's assessment in paragraph
16513 it must be concluded that the content of this indirect
evidence should be evaluated not only in the light of possible
dispute by the incriminated companies but also against their
effective behavior on the market. Thus, it is obvious that final
evidence against cartels results not only from each element of
proof taken separately but from the combination of these ele-
ments with each other particularly when their contents reflect
with precision the economic or commercial realities of the
market in question. Paragraph 166 36 summarizes clearly this
approach in concluding that "having regard to all these cir-
cumstances it must be held that these documents form a body
of consistent evidence and that their contents correspond, at
least for the most part, to the facts. '"137
It must be noted that the Court's requirement that evi-
dence corresponds "for the most part" to the factual situation
is all the more important, if one considers that the Court of
Justice explicitly recognizes here that it would be unreasonable
to demand that the evidence reported by the Commission in
order to describe and characterize the incriminating conduct
of the parties concerned should be totally exempted from any
doubt or uncertainty. In fact, neither the economic and rela-
tional life of companies nor their documentation and mailing
133. Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. at 1940, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 423-24.
134. Id. at 1940, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 423.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1941, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 424.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
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practice is organized solely with the purpose of establishing
clear and indisputable evidence of infringement of the rules of
competition in order to satisfy and facilitate the task of the en-
forcing authority.
. In requiring only a certain amount of consistency between
the documentary evidence advanced by the Commission and
the reality of the alleged conduct violating competition rules,
the Court of Justice demonstrates a certain pragmatism, which
seems, unfortunately, somewhat forgotten by the Court of
First Instance in its Flat Glass '3s and Polypropylene 139 judgments
of March 10, 1992. Indeed, in Suiker Unie, the Court of Justice
retained first of all evidence proving the multiple contacts be-
tween the accused firms as well as indirect evidence of collu-
sion between them, whereas in the Dyestuffs case, it gave more
importance to the presumptions resulting from market analy-
sis.140
In its Flat Glass judgment, the CFI goes further in stating
that "the appropriate definition of the market in question is a
necessary precondition of any judgment concerning allegedly
anti-competitive behaviour."' 4'' Regarding the similarities in
the pricing policy of the companies involved, which were evi-
denced in the Commission's decision through the notification
to customers of identical price increases at close dates or
sometimes on the same day, the CFI merely retains as indica-
tions of cooperation only elements of "actual coincidence" of
both the date and the amount of increase between the produ-
cers' pricing announcements. 42
This requirement concerning acceptable evidence, in
other words the complete "coincidence" in the date and the
amount of the price increase, exceeds considerably the condi-
tions imposed by Court of Justice in the Dyestuffs case as re-
gards the admissibility of evidence against cartels. More
alarming yet is the attitude of the CFI that tends to appreciate
findings of fact and pieces of evidence individually, examining
138. Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance).
139. See infra notes 147-48 (describing Polypropylene decisions).
140. Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295; ICI, Case 48/69,
[1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557.
141. Flat Glass, [1992] E.C.R. at __, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at __, 159.
142. Id. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -, 193.
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if each of them alone is sufficient to prove the alleged coopera-
tion, contrary to the consistent case law of the Court ofJustice
which evaluates the various elements of evidence in relation to
each other as well as to the behavior of the companies. In this
respect paragraph 200 of the CFI judgment explicitly stated
that "the fact that the discounts granted to some wholesalers
by the three producers coincide is not sufficient, in itself, to
prove systematic concerted action among the three producers
in relation to the discounts granted to wholesalers in gen-
eral."' 4 3 For the CFI, it is more important that the producers
"did not all grant their discounts with the same system and
criteria" ' 44 according to the tables produced.
The same attitude is manifest in the treatment of the
Polypropylene cases.'4 5 Most of the companies involved in the
cartel applied for the annulment of the Commission's deci-
sion. 146 In a series of judgments the CFI rejected eight 147 of
the applications and partially accepted the remaining six
14 8 of
them estimating that, as regards certain periods of time, the
Commission had not conclusively proved the participation of
143. Id. at _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -, 200.
144. Id.
145. O.J. L 230/1 (1986).
146. See infra notes 147-48 (citing decisions of Court of First Instance on these
applications).
147. Hercules, Case T-7/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not yet re-
ported); DSM NV v. Commission, Case T-8/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not
yet reported); Rh6ne-Poulenc v. Commission, Case T-1/89 (Ct. First Instance Oct.
24, 1991) (not yet reported); Atochem SA v. Commission, Case T-3/89 (Ct. First
Instance Oct. 24, 1991) (not yet reported); Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case T-10/
89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Solvay SA v. Commission,
Case T-12/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported), Montedipe SpA
v. Commission, Case T-14/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported);
Chemie Linz AG v. Commission, Case T-15/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992)
(not yet reported).
148. See Petrofina SA v. Commission, Case T-2/89 (Ct. First Instance Oct. 24,
1991) (not yet reported) (reducing fine from ECU600,000 to ECU300,000); BASF
AG'v. Commission, Case T-4/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not yet reported)
(reducing fine from ECU2,500,000 to ECU2,125,000); Enichem Anic SpA v. Com-
mission, Case T-6/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not yet reported) (reducing
fine from ECU750,000 to ECU450,000); Hills v. Commission, Case T-9/89 (Ct. First
Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (reducing fine from ECU2,750,000 to
ECU2,330,000); Shell Int'l Chem. Co. v. Commission, Case T-I 1/89 (Ct. First In-
stance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (reducing fine from ECU9,000,000 to
ECU8,100,000); Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-13/89 (Ct. First
Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (reducing fine from ECU10,000,000 to
ECU9,000,000)).
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the companies in the cartel, and reduced the fines accordingly.
In its judgments the CFI examines each incriminating act
(price initiatives, participation in meetings, etc.) individually
and evaluates the evidence of the firm's participation in this act
separately from its global conduct over a long period. This
leads to the somewhat peculiar result that, to give an example,
a company which is found guilty of participating in a cartel
agreement from mid-1977 to September 1983, is acquitted of
participating in a January-May 1981 price initiative.' 49
It should be noted in this occasion that, according to the
reporting Judge Vesterdorf, the overall view of the evidence
was a very important factor in these cases. Judge Vesterdorf
stated that
even where it is possible to give a reasonable alternative ex-
planation of a specific document, which may be isolated
from a number of documents, the explanation in question
might not withstand closer examination in the context of an
overall evaluation of a whole body of evidence. It must ac-
cordingly be permissible to apply, as the Commission does,
conclusions drawn from periods where the evidence is fairly
solid to other periods where the gap between the various
pieces of evidence is perhaps larger.'5 0
This quite pertinent piece of advice should not be lost in the
future developments of CFI case law concerning proof stan-
dards. However, as things stand, one is tempted to conclude
that to avoid being fined, it is enough for cartel members to
vary the external appearance and the timing of their concerted
actions or simply to "cheat" from time to time by not following
the cartel instructions. It might even come to the point where,
as Judge Vesterdorf seems to suggest,' 5 in cases of varying
implementation actions the Commission might be requested to
establish the existence of a mutual understanding of the cartel
members that, for instance, if"A is to do a, B is to do b, C is to
do c and so on,"' 15 which, as the Judge himself admits, should
be extraordinarily difficult to prove other than by direct docu-
mentary evidence.
149. Shell, slip op. 190.
150. Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1992]
E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 173, § I.E.2 (Ct. First Instance).
151. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 157-58, § I.D.3(i).
152. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 162, § I.D.3(j).
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Apart from the specific assessments of the evidentiary
value of documents or other pieces of evidence supporting the
Commission's presumptions in these cases, probably more sig-
nificant is the overall approach of the CFI in its Flat Glass and
Polypropylene judgments. It is clear that the Court of First In-
stance insists on examining the documentary evidence sepa-
rately from the global context of the producers' effective be-
havior on the market, so that only documents or document
parts containing direct evidence of participation in the cartel
are retained. This could seriously reduce the scope of circum-
stantial evidence admissible in cartel cases and, consequently,
the efficiency of the antitrust action of the Commission. Nev-
ertheless, one should not jump to the conclusion that the case
law concerning the concept of cartel as it applies to concerted
practices has definitely taken a more restrictive direction re-
garding admissible evidence, at least not before the CFI has
had the occasion to examine more cases of this kind.
3. Economic Evidence--Analysis of the Structure
of the Market
The concept of economic evidence, as opposed to that of
legal or documentary evidence, does not have any real exist-
ence outside and independent of the concept of concerted
practice. Indeed, evidence of the latter is precisely based on
the presumption that the incriminated companies intentionally
adopt a parallel behavior inexplicable by economic analysis,
while in the case of cartels based on anti-competitive agree-
ments, market effects are secondary.15 3 Certainly, an element
of legal relation (e.g., a signed agreement) between the partici-
pants is not indispensable, but parallel or even identical con-
duct of several market operators is not sufficient to prove a
cartel in the absence of any element of agreement between
them, even if the companies concerned are conscious about
the parallelism of their commercial behavior.
In other words, identical conduct constitutes nothing
more than a first indication of cooperation. The fact that the
153. Wernhard M6schel, Use of Economic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation in the FRG,
32 ANTITRUST BULL. 523 (1987). Professor M6schel correctly points out that, regard-
ing the use of economic criteria in the application of German antitrust law against
horizontal restraints, the key factual element itself, restraint of trade, is managed
without reference to economic analysis. Id. at 529.
CARTELS: PROOF AND PROCEDURE
companies involved are aware that they are acting in an identi-
cal manner constitutes a second indication of cooperation
which reinforces the first. The question that remains to be an-
swered is whether these indications together with other frag-
mentary evidence constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient
to support a presumption of infringement and to incriminate
the companies concerned for violation of antitrust law.
U.S. case law qualifies conscious parallelism of behavior as
an indication of concerted practice. The 1956 judgment of
Morton Salt Co. v. United States 154 retains that a consciously par-
allel behavior is likely to weigh heavily in the appreciation of
the case in question. In fact, both in U.S. and in European case
law, conscious parallel behavior, once it is admitted as an indi-
cation of cartel activity, gives rise to a thorough examination of
the conditions under which a cartel agreement can be pre-
sumed. Both legal systems admit that, if such an agreement
cannot be proved by other means (direct documentary evi-
dence, testimony, etc.), its existence can nevertheless be in-
ferred from the effective conduct of the companies on the mar-
ket in question. Under U.S. law, parallelism of behavior can-
not be qualified as a per se violation of the Sherman Act, but
leads to an analysis of this behavior in order to determine if, on
the basis of the situation in the relevant market, it would be
inconceivable that the obvious uniformity of behavior was
achieved without prior agreement. This leads to the conclu-
sion that the existence of an agreement in such cases is not
proved but deduced or, to be exact, presumed by deduction.
Paragraph 66 of the ICI judgment 5 5 defines an equivalent
principle in somewhat different terms, stating that
although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified
with a concerted practice, it may however amount to strong
evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of com-
petition which do not correspond to the normal conditions
of the market, having regard to the nature of the products,
the size and the number of the undertakings, and the vol-
ume of the said market. 156
For all that, are we entitled to speak about economic evidence?
154. 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956).
155. ICI, Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, 655, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557, 622-23.
156. Id.
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Unfortunately, economic analysis by itself cannot demonstrate
in a scientific manner the exact significance of a commercial or
industrial behavior in a specific market. Certainly, it is admit-
ted that careful analysis of the market structure can provide a
plausible explanation of certain behavioral patterns such as
those resulting from price leadership or from oligopoly. But
such a pattern does not always imply collusion.
Summarizing this principle, Melchior Wathelet' 57 ob-
serves that an economic analysis is necessary to determine to
what extent the structure of the market imposes, explains, or
makes impossible parallel behavior. Having completed this
analysis, a conclusion can be reached about the probability or
improbability that the observed parallel behavior is in fact co-
ordinated. If parallel behavior is or could reasonably be
thought to be imposed by the structure of the market,' eco-
nomic evidence cannot be used under any circumstances as an
indication of cooperation. If, on the other hand, the structure
of the market is unable to provide any plausible explanation of
the observed parallelism of behavior, cooperation between
market operators could be presumed. The difficulty comes
from the fact that between these two relatively clear cut but
mostly theoretical situations numerous cases can be observed
where the market structure, without really imposing a parallel
behavior, can nevertheless be quite useful in providing a plau-
sible explanation or even a justification of otherwise discon-
certing similarities in the commercial behavior of companies
competing with each other. In the Dyestuffs case, companies in-
voked the economic laws that apply to oligopolistic markets in
order to demonstrate that no conclusive evidence of coopera-
tion could be drawn from the observation of simultaneous and
similar price increases. Indeed, they claimed that in an oligo-
polistic market, each company has to adapt its behavior to that
of the company first implementing the price increase. Accord-
ing to this theory, markets composed of producers of
equivalent size or competitive strength involve to some extent
a system of random price leadership. On the other hand, in
the traditional system of the dominant price leader, one pro-
157. Melchior Wathelet, Pratiques Concerties et Comportements Paralliles en Oligopole:
Le Cas des Matires Colorants, 11 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 663
(1975).
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ducer holding a stronger competitive position systematically
initiates the price increase.
In an oligopolistic market of this nature all producers are
well aware of each other and have thorough knowledge not
only of the prices charged by the others for the various prod-
ucts but also, especially if the products are homogeneous, the
price structure of each competitor. Under the constant pres-
sure of purchasers, the prices undergo a continuous erosion
until a critical point is reached and one of the competitors or
the dominant producer is forced to react by implementing a
reasonable price increase while being more or less certain that
the other producers will react in identical terms without a prior
agreement or concerted action. Despite the fact that neither
the Commission nor the Court of Justice accepted this argu-
ment in the Dyestuffs case, the validity of the reasoning itself
was not contested in principle.
In order to solve the problem, the Court of Justice pro-
ceeded to a comparison of the market situation resulting from
the alleged concerted practice with the competitive situation
that would correspond to the normal conditions of the specific
market, taking into consideration the nature of the products,
the volume of the market as well as the importance and the
number of the competitors involved. If parallel behavior,
although not restrictive of competition in itself, is likely to af-
ford the interested parties the possibility to reach a price equi-
librium on a level different from that which would have re-
sulted from competition, and to consolidate acquired market
positions to the detriment both of the effective freedom of
movement of the products in the common market as well as of
the freedom of consumers to choose their suppliers, then such
behavior constitutes an indication of concerted practice which
could be qualified as serious.
Maintenance of acquired market positions, e.g., market
shares, over a long period constitutes a phenomenon which,
without being in itself abnormal, deserves a specific examina-
tion. Indeed, if consolidation of a market position in the long
term cannot be explained rationally without some sort of con-
certed action of the operators involved in the market, then the
existence of an agreement, or at least a concerted practice, will
have to be presumed. In this context, individual commercial
behavior can reveal the existence of collective agreements hav-
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ing as their object precisely the. respect of acquired positions.
This could be the case with refusals to sell unjustified from an
economic standpoint or in view of the stocks available. Such
refusals to supply customers could also be regarded as an addi-
tional indication of concertation. In the Sugar case, for exam-
ple, refusals to supply were considered as a concerted practice
aiming at protecting and maintaining the agreed bulkheading
of the national market of each competitor.
Finally, it should be noted that economic analysis is used
only to corroborate or explain other evidence. It can never be
used directly as the basis of a legal assessment. That means on
one hand that the Commission cannot accuse oligopolists of
cartel activity only because market analysis demonstrates that,
for example, the. price level cannot be explained otherwise
than by a cartel agreement. On the other hand, even if an in-
criminated company could prove that the market continues to
behave in a normal competitive manner, this does not mean
that no cartel agreement or concerted practice has taken place,
if the existence of it is proved by documentary or other direct
evidence.
4. Testimony Evidence
Being for all practical purposes an administration, even if
it is often portrayed as a "quasi-penal" one, particularly when
it applies Articles 85-86 of the EEC Treaty and imposes fines,
the Commission, nevertheless, does not have the powers
vested in a penal jurisdiction particularly as far as the proce-
dure for the establishment of truth is concerned. As already
mentioned above, the procedure is primarily based on docu-
mentary evidence concerning the incriminating facts or cir-
cumstances. The Community procedure leaves only limited
space for evidence by testimony. The Commission does not
retain testimony as evidence of an infringement because the
applicable procedures do not provide for the possibility to give
evidence under oath.
However, on one hand, companies are free to produce all
elements they consider useful for their defense. On the other
hand, the Commission can also make use of evidence in the
form of written declarations of the persons in charge of the
companies involved in the procedure, or of third parties, in or-
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der to explain, make comprehensible, or get an insight into a
piece of documentary evidence not sufficiently explicit in itself.
Thus, certain documents that are likely to constitute a direct
evidence of cartel agreements, such as minutes of meetings or
internal company notes, are often written with the sole pur-
pose of keeping a trace of the commitments entered into by
the parties to an agreement or just to inform interested third
parties. The drafting of such documents, intended for use by
initiates exclusively, often gives rise to confusion insofar as
they contain exotic abbreviations, codes, or initials that render
reading and interpretation by third non-initiated persons, in
particular by the agents of the Commission, extremely difficult.
In such circumstances, the Commission can always ask the
participants in the reported meeting or agreement to provide
some oral explanations in order to clarify the specific signifi-
cance of the terms, abbreviations, or codes used in the docu-
ment. Such testimony cannot be qualified in itself as evidence
but contributes undoubtedly to the establishment of evidence,
especially if it comes from a relevant person or from a com-
pany directly involved in the procedure either as a member or
as a victim of the cartel. Certainly, the value of this type of
testimony evidence remains relative and it can be contradicted
by other testimonies, if they are supported by elements of
proof sufficient to ensure their credibility.
Using the powers of investigation provided in Council
Regulation No. 17/62, the Commission can oblige a company,
by imposing fines or periodic penalty payments if necessary, to
supply all relevant information concerning an alleged infringe-
ment, even if this information establishes the evidence or
strengthens the presumption of an infringement against that
company. From this point of view, it can be stated that the
privilege of non-incrimination against oneself does not exist in
EC competition law.' 5 a That does not mean that a company
could be forced to testify against itself. The administrative
procedure provided for the enforcement of competition rules
by the Commission does not include testimony under oath.
According to the Court of Justice, companies are obliged to
collaborate with the Commission and to supply exact and com-
plete information in response to a written request on the basis
158. See generally Joshua, supra note 84, at 336-.40.
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of Article 11 of Regulation No. 17/62, or to communicate the
complete documentation asked for during investigations car-
ried out on the basis of Article 14(2) or 14(3) of the same regu-
lation. 159
Thus, an incriminating statement made by a company in
response to a written request for information could give the
Commission the possibility to bring charges not only against
its author, but also against third parties expressly mentioned in
the statement. Such declarations are to some extent authenti-
cated by the legal obligation of their exactitude imposed by
Regulation No. 17/62. For all practical purposes, they could
therefore be compared with testimony under oath pronounced
before a tribunal and constituting direct evidence. Their value
is, however, far from being equivalent to that of testimony
under oath.
According to Article 3(3) of Commission Regulation No.
99/63 ofJuly 25, 1963160 regarding the hearings of companies
receiving a Statement of Objections, these can propose that
the Commission hears persons who may corroborate the facts
set out in their written response to the objections. Testimony
in this case allows the companies suspected of infringement to
invite third-party witnesses to explain, describe, and confirm
the facts relevant to their defense. This opportunity to make
use of witnesses does not, however, impose any legal obliga-
tion on the third party concerned. On its side, the Commis-
sion is free to satisfy this request or to reject it.
Reciprocally, under Article 7(2) of the same regulation,
the Commission may also invite certain witnesses to express
orally their point of view on the entire case or on specific as-
pects of the current procedure. 16 1 These testimonies do not
have any absolute probative force, but aim rather at enabling
the Commission to appreciate better the events under scrutiny
in their real economic or legal context.
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
An effective competition policy constitutes one of the es-
sential conditions for the achievement of a single market and
159. See infra text accompanying notes 162-238 (discussing procedural issues).
160. J.O. L 127/2268 (1963), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 47.
161. Id. art. 7(2), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 48.
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the harmonious development of companies through the opti-
mum allocation of resources. Among the tasks an antitrust au-
thority is entrusted with, prohibition and repression of cartels
hold a prominent position. In fact, horizontal agreements be-
tween competitors often constitute the most harmful form of
collective restriction of competition, the most contrary to in-
terests of consumers and third parties.
Like most public authorities enforcing antitrust legisla-
tion, the Commission of the European Communities disposes
of important powers of investigation set out principally in
Council Regulation No. 17/62.162 This regulation enables the
Commission to take all necessary steps to detect cartels and
put an end to their activity, or on the contrary to authorize
them under certain conditions. Antitrust investigation is an act
of public authority. As such, it is limited by the obligation to
respect the civil rights of physical persons and companies ac-
cording to the principles of legal order recognized in all the
Member States and protected by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.
In adopting Regulation No. 17/62, the Council of Minis-
ters entrusted the Commission with monitoring the compli-
ance of market operators with the rules of competition both for
reasons of neutrality and of uniformity of implementation of
these rules in the various Member States, but also for reasons
of efficiency since in cartel cases necessary information con-
cerning infringements of antitrust legislation has often to be
sought beyond the borders of a single state. While on the ba-
sis of the "effects doctrine"'' 63  EEC antitrust rules apply to
agreements between companies situated outside the Commu-
nity, the question of the extraterritorial application of the
Commission's powers of investigation is more'delicate. 64 In
162. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, Oj. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87, 90.
163. See Commission Press Release, IP (88) 573 (1988) (commenting on Euro-
pean Court of Justice's recent decision in A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commission,
Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125-129/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. 901. But see J.R. Atwood & C. Lister, International Antitrust Enforcement in the
George Bush Administration: the Enforcement Guidelines and Beyond, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L.
97, 103 (1989) (describing this interpretation of Wood Pulp by Commission and 1988
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations of U.S. Department
of Justice).
164. KERSE, supra note 113, at 87-88; M. Slater, Lapplication Extraterritoriale du
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practice, the Commission never carries out inspections in third
countries. Such inspections could only take place with the au-
thorization of the state concerned.' 65 On the contrary, infor-
mal requests for information are sent to companies outside the
EEC. 166 In any case, if the company has a subsidiary within the
EEC, a formal Article 11 request preferably is served to the
subsidiary. However, the wide-ranging powers of the Commis-
sion also gave rise to numerous criticisms and misunderstand-
ings. For instance, it is submitted that concentrating in the
hands of a single institution the power to take decisions
prohibiting or exempting agreements, to deliver negative
clearances, to adopt block exemption regulations, to initiate
investigations, to address written requests for information to
individual companies or to carry out investigations under war-
rant (non-compulsory) or order (compulsory) at the offices of
suspected firms, to impose fines or periodical penalty pay-
ments for non-respect of competition rules, in other words to
combine at the same time the functions of police, public prose-
cutor, and judge, could result in a situation unfair for the com-
panies involved. Procedural issues focusing on the real scope
and the limitations of the fact finding powers of the Commis-
sion are probably in the center of the debate concerning its
activities in the field of prosecution and repression of secret
cartels.
A. Powers of Investigation
The Commission's powers of investigation are stated in
Council Regulation No. 17/62: discovery powers involving
written requests or orders to produce information on the basis
of Article 11, the power to carry out sector inquiries on the
basis of Article 12, the power to carry out on-the-spot investi-
gations under warrant or order on the basis of Article 14, and
Droit Communautaire, C.D. EUR. 309, 316 (1986); see generally Joachim Schmidt-
Hermesdorf, Internationale Rechtshilfe in Kartellsachen, 32 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFr 180 (1986); Atwood & Lister, supra note 163, at 103-11 (explaining extra-
territorial application in U.S. law); David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the
Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United ,States, 34 AM. J. CoMP. L. 745
(1986) (same).
165. WHISH, supra note 33, at 391.
166. Council Regulation No: 17/62, supra note 9, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 87, 90. This is based on Article 11 but contains no mention of Article 15 conse-
quences for refusal to submit or incomplete submission. Id.
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the possibility to request the competent authorities of Member
States to carry out investigations on the Commission's behalf
on the basis of Article 13.
Sector inquiries and investigations carried out by the
Member States on behalf of the Commission seldomly are em-
ployed and in the final analysis are badly suited to the repres-
sion of multinational cartels. The Article 12 procedure is only
implemented when the Commission has reasons to suspect
that competition is distorted across a whole industry. 6 '
Although there is no need for strong evidence of infringe-
ments, a formal decision of the Commission after consultation
with the Advisory Committee is necessary in order to launch
the inquiry. A sector inquiry involves investigations in the
firms concerned and can be combined with requests for infor-
mation on the basis of Article 11 and inspections on the basis
of Article 14. The Article 13 procedure is also rarely used by
the Commission to delegate to the Member States the power
to carry out investigations under the EEC rules of competition.
The possibility exists that it may be used more frequently in
the future as an application of the principle of subsidiarity en-
shrined in the Treaty of the European Union.
In practice, written requests for information and on-the-
spot inspections constitute by far the Commissions' most privi-
leged methods of investigation. Both must respect two basic
principles: the principle of necessity and the principle of pro-
portionality. The principle of necessity arises explicitly from
the phrasing of Articles 11, 12 and 14 of Regulation No. 17/62
which authorize only requests of "necessary" information and
"necessary" inspections. It belongs to the Commission to ap-
preciate the necessary character of its investigations. 16
The principle of proportionality means that the Commis-
sion should take particular care not to use inadequate or dis-
proportional enforcement measures when investigating a car-
167. See COMMISSION FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 124 (1972) (dis-
cussing that article 12 has been used only two times to investigate margarine industry
and tying of bars to breweries); COMMISSION THIRD REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
14-15 (1974) (regarding similar situation in oil sector).
168. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
1610, 17, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264, 322; Solvay & Cie v. Commission, Case 27/88,
[1989] E.C.R. 3355, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502. Solvay was decided on grounds similar
as Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502.
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tel case. In order to evaluate the proportionality of its fact-
finding measures, the Commission considers the seriousness
of the suspected infringements and the fact that the informa-
tion it seeks is mostly kept secret.
1. Requests for Information on the Basis of Article 11
Article 11 empowers the Commission to obtain from
Member State governments and competent antitrust authori-
ties, as well as from undertakings and associations of undertak-
ings, all information necessary for the enforcement of competi-
tion rules. The Commission must first address a simple re-
quest for information under Article 11(1) and, if the company
does not respond by supplying the requested information
within the fixed time limit, or responds by supplying incom-
plete information, the Commission can at a second stage adopt
a formal decision within the meaning of Article 11 (5) ordering
the company to do so.' 6 9
a. Simple Requests-Article 11 (1)
The request for information is subject to certain rules re-
garding its form and its contents. It must be addressed to the
company concerned by means of a registered letter with ac-
knowledgment of receipt. The letter must specify the legal ba-
sis and the purpose of the request and remind its recipient of
the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(b) for supplying in-
accurate information. A copy of the request is forwarded to
the antitrust authority of the Member State in whose territory
the seat of the firm or association is situated. Further, the
Commission must indicate, at least in brief, the nature of the
suspected infringement of Articles 85 or 86 of the EEC Treaty
as well as a deadline for response.
b. Orders-Article 11(5) and Penalties for Noncompliance
This decision, which orders the company to submit the
necessary information, must specify what information is re-
quired, fix an appropriate time limit for compliance with the
order, indicate the penalties provided for in Articles 15(l)(b)
and 16(l)(c) and inform the company of its right to have the
169. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R.
2033, 2053-54, 10, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169, 184.
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decision reviewed by the Court ofJustice. Article 15(1)(b) em-
powers the Commission to impose fines from ECU100 to
ECU5000 if the company provides inaccurate information or
persists in its refusal to answer within the fixed time limit. Ac-
cording to Article 16(1)(c), the Commission can impose peri-
odic penalty payments of ECU50 to ECU 1000 per day in order
to compel the company to supply complete and correct infor-
mation requested by the Commission by means of the Article
11 (5) order.
c. Defense to Article 11 Requests or Orders
Two judgments delivered by the Court of Justice on Octo-
ber 18, 1989, Solvay & Cie v. Commission and Orkem v. Commission
specify the extent of the Commission's powers as regards re-
quests for information.' 70 The Court stated in particular that a
request for information referring explicitly to suspected agree-
ments violating Article 85(1) does not correspond to a state-
ment of objections but constitutes simply the justification for
the engagement of an investigation. The Court specified fur-
ther that the Commission can collect under Article 11 docu-
ments accessible also under Article 14. As far as the privilege
against self-incrimination is concerned, the Court of Justice
pointed out in the Solvay and Orkem judgments that it does not
apply to a discovery ordered by a statutory authority such as
the, Commission. Such a principle could never serve for the
defense of legal entities being requested to provide informa-
tion by means of a non-criminal procedure. 7 ' However, the
Court of Justice fixed a clear limit to the discovery powers of
the Commission in cases where the request for information is
likely to violate the rights of defense by compelling the com-
pany to provide answers which would cause it to admit the
existence of an infringement or acknowledge its participation
in agreements restricting competition. While the Commis-
170. Solvay & Cie, [1989] E.C.R. 3355, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502; Orkem, [1989]
E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502.
171. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. at 3350-51, 27-31, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 555-56.
But see Thomas Kiihlhorn, Ermittlungen der EG-Kommission nach Art. 11 und 14 der VO
17/62, 36 WIRTSCHAFr UND WETTBEWERB 7, 9-17 (1986) (contesting arguments from
Article 15(4) of Regulation No. 17/62 and fact that firms are legal and not natural
persons 'as formalistic with examples from British and German legislation and case
law).
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sion's discretion about what information is necessary is largely
recognized by the Court, 172 it cannot formulate its questions
about the firm's participation in a cartel in such a way that to
answer them would oblige the company to confess an infringe-
ment of competition rules. 173
The Court ofJustice pointed out in this respect that a writ-
ten question about precise actions or concerted measures
likely to have been envisaged or adopted to support price ini-
tiatives within the framework of the cartel, is liable to compel
the companies to acknowledge their participation in an agree-
ment restricting competition or to state that they intended to
achieve this objective.' 74 The Court treated in the same way
other requests for information concerning quotas, sales
targets, or market sharing between producers. It concluded
that the Commission, by compelling the company to acknowl-
edge an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, violated
the rights of defense of companies receiving an order to supply
information on the basis of Article 11 (5) and thus fixed, for the
first time, strict limits to the use of this provision of Regulation
No. 17/62.
A number of other arguments against discovery requests
or orders has been examined by the Commission and the
Court ofJustice. Among them were several unsuccessful argu-
ments: on grounds that the phrasing of Article. 11 refers to
"information" and not to "documents;"'' 75 on grounds that
this might expose the firm or its employees to criminal sanc-
tions in the Member States or in a non-EC country, for exam-
ple, Switzerland; 76 on grounds that disclosure might breach
fiduciary duty177 or violate the rules of a trade association re-
garding confidentiality of meetings and authorizations;17 8 or
on the basis of arguments on the merits of the case. 179
172. Orkem, [1989] E.C.R. at 3347-48, 4 15-16, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 553.
173. Id. at 3351-53, 4 32-41, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 556-57.
174. Id. at 3352, 4 38, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 557.
175. Id. at 3347, 4 13-14, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 552-53.
176. Central Stikstof Verkoopkantoor BV ("CSV"), OJ. L 242/15 (1978).
177.' Fides, Milan, O.J. L 57/33 (1979) (asserting that it could not supply infor-
mation requested by Commission unless authorized by principles involved).
178. F6d~ration Nationale de l'Industrie de la Chaussure de France ("FNICF"),
O.J. L 319/12, at 13 (1982).
179. See RITrER, ET AL., supra note 39, at 628 n.196 (containing more objections
to these discovery procedures).
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2. Inspections on the Basis of Article 14
Requesting information and inspecting a firm's seat are
not part of a two-stage procedure. The Commission carries
out inspections into companies that are members of a cartel
whenever it considers it necessary. A prior written request for
information is not necessary.
In its National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission "' judg-
ment, the Court ofJustice pointed out that Regulation No. 17/
62 "provides for separate procedures, which shows that the ex-
ercise of the powers given to the Commission with regard to
information and investigations is not subject to the same con-
ditions." ' 1 Further, the argument of the firm seeking to annul
the Commission's decision on grounds that Article 14 provides
for a two stage procedure obliging the Commission to issue
first an investigation warrant based on Article 14(2) and then
an order based on Article 14(3) was rejected by the Court.1 2
Taking into consideration the necessity of an investigation in
view of the circumstances of the case, the Commission dis-
poses, according to the Court ofJustice, of a broad discretion-
ary margin concerning the means of carrying out such investi-
gations.
When there is a specific risk of disappearance of crucial
evidence or when it is necessary to carry out simultaneous in-
spections (so-called "dawn raids") in several companies sus-
pected of being members of a cartel, the Commission opts for
surprise inspections under order on the basis of article 14(3).
In other cases, it is satisfied with announced inspections under
warrant ("simple" inspections) on the basis of Article 14(2).
a. Non-Compulsory "Authorizations to Investigate" Under
Warrant-Article 14(2)
"Simple" inspections are announced to the concerned
firm beforehand and are carried out by officials of the Commis-
sion on the basis of an "authorization to investigate" signed by
the Director-General of DG-IV on the authority of the member
of the Commission responsible for competition. This authori-
zation is a warrant stating the names of the Commission's in-
180. Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2033, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169.
181. Id. at 2053-56, 8-16, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 183-86.
182. Id.
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spectors authorized to conduct the investigation and specifying
the subject matter and purpose of the investigation and the
penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(c) in cases where pro-
duction of the required books or other documents and busi-
ness records is incomplete. The competent authorities of the
Member State in whose territory the investigation will take
place are informed beforehand both of the investigation's mis-
sion and of the identity of the authorized officials. In some
Member States an official from the national antitrust authority
accompanies and assists the Commission's officials. Assistance
can be requested either by the Member State or by the Com-
mission.
The object of the inspection covers all information liable
to establish factual evidence of an infringement of competition
rules and the exact circumstances of the firm's participation in
the suspected restrictive agreement or cartel. Documents
found during the inspection must allow the Commission to sit-
uate the alleged infringement in its precise legal and economic
context. After having produced their warrant and an explana-
tory note setting out the rights and duties of the company in
relation to the inspection, the agents of the Commission ask
the company whether it intends to accept the inspection. The
company has the right to refuse; the agents take note of this
refusal in an official report. If the company agrees to submit
itself to the inspection, it must do so without reservation in
other words, it must enable the agent of the Commission to
exercise all the powers set out in Article 14(1) of the Regula-
tion No. 17/62.
Submission to the inspection has to be total. The com-
pany cannot accept an inspection " la carte," enabling it to
submit to certain parts of the checking and to refuse to com-
municate other specific information.1 8 3 Refusal to communi-
cate certain documents during the inspection can be consid-
ered as incomplete production of required books or business
records liable to sanctions under Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation
No. 17/62. The company can ask to be assisted by a lawyer
and it is admitted that the Commission's officials can delay the
183. Fedration Nationale de l'Industrie de la Chaussure de France ("FNICF"),
O.J. L 319/12, at 13-14 (1982) (criticizing FNICF for submitting incomplete docu-
mentation).
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beginning of the inspection for a reasonable period of time in
order to allow this lawyer to arrive. 184
b. Compulsory Inspections Under Order-Article 14(3)
The Commission resorts to compulsory inspections, or-
dered by means of a formal decision, when it considers that
there is a risk of disappearance of the evidence or that there
are reasons to believe that the company will refuse to submit to
a "simple" inspection. Inspection orders are normally signed
by the competent member of the Commission personally.8 5
The Commission's decision ordering a surprise inspection
specifies the subject matter and purpose of the investigation
and indicates the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(c) and
16(1)(d) and the right to have the decision reviewed by the
Court of Justice.
There is no need for the Commission to disclose in the
decision ordering an inspection the complete list of indications
or pieces of evidence supporting its presumptions of infringe-
ment. In its Hoechst AG v. Commission judgment of September
21, 1989,186 the Court of Justice pointed out that the require-
ments and conditions provided for in Article 14(3) constitute a
fundamental guarantee of the rights of the defense and that
the Commission has to indicate clearly the presumptions of in-
fringement that it intends to investigate. Nevertheless, "the
Commission is not required to communicate to the addressee
of a decision ordering an investigation all the information at its
disposal concerning the presumed infringements."'8 7 In the
specific case the Court observed that the decision, although
"drawn up in very general terms which might well have been
made more precise" contained "none the less ... the essential
184. Julian M. Joshua, The Investigative Powers of the EEC Commission in Competition
Cases, G.P., Nos. 158-59, 7-8Juin, 1991, at 23, 25 (Fr.) (commenting that such delay
is allowed on condition that the premises be secured).
185. Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC
1109 n.34 (2d ed. 1990) (describing "habilitation"); RITrER, ET AL., supra note 39,
at 634 n.244 (same).
186, Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410; Dow Chem. Ib~rica SA v. Commission, Joined Cases
97-99/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3165, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410; Dow Benelux NV v. Commis-
sion, Case 85/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3137, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410.
187. Hoechst, [1989] E.C.R. at 2929-30, 41, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 469-70.
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indications prescribed by Article 14(3)"i' 88 and rejected
Hoechst's recourse.
An Article 14(3) decision has the following legal conse-
quences: the company concerned is required to submit to the
inspection. In case of refusal it faces fines from ECU100 to
ECU5000 and periodic penalty payments from ECU50 to
ECU1000 per day of persistence in the refusal. Furthermore,
the interested Member State has to afford the Commission's
officials the assistance necessary to carry out their specific mis-
sion. it must be noted that the Commission's inspectors do
not dispose of any power to compel the company to submit to
the investigation. Assistance from the national authority cov-
ers the entire range of the powers of investigation provided for
in Article 14(1).189 For instance, the national authority cannot
limit its assistance to the access to the buildings and refuse it as
regards the access to company books and business records.
Such a limitation would indeed deprive the inspection of its
useful effect. According to the Hoechst judgment of the Court
of Justice, when the Commission runs up against the opposi-
tion of a company to an inspection, its officials can, even with-
out any collaboration from the company, seek on the basis of
Article 14(6), all the elements of information necessary, with
the assistance of the national authorities.' According to para-
graph thirty-three of this judgment, Member States are re-
quired to ensure that the Commission's action is effective. 9 '
Nevertheless, the same judgment specifies that when the Com-
mission is forced to carry out an inspection without the collab-
oration of the company involved and therefore it needs the
assistance of the national authorities within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 14(6), the Commission's officials are required to comply
with the specific procedural guarantees provided for in such a
case by national law.' 9'
As regards, further, the national legal framework allowing
antitrust authorities in the Member States to assist effectively
the Commission during an inspection, Member States have a
188. Id. at 2930, 42, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 470.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 209-21 (discussing powers of Commu-
nity's inspectors under Article 14(1)).
190. Hoechst, [1989] E.C.R. at 2928, 33, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.
191. See infra notes 192-208 and accompanying text (discussing how discovery
procedures protect fundamental rights).
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specific obligation insofar as Article 14(6) of Regulation No.
17/62 stipulates that they must adopt all necessary measures
to organize and facilitate the implementation of this procedure
in practice.
c. Protection of Fundamental Rights
Enforcement of an inspection order is similar in many re-
spects to a genuine search of premises and as such it supposes
that all precautions are taken to safeguard the fundamental
rights of the companies and persons involved. As regards
searching professional premises in the economic or fiscal field,
certain Member States recognize in their national legal order
the principle of preliminary judicial control. Community law
also recognizes that the fundamental rights of individuals faced
with administrative measures taken by a Community institution
must be protected. According to the Court of Justice in Na-
tional Panasonic, 192 "fundamental rights form an integral part of
the general principles of law, the observance of which the
Court ofJustice ensures, in accordance with constitutional tra-
ditions common to the Member States and with international
treaties on which the Member States have collaborated or of
which they are signatories." 93
Unfortunately, constitutional rules and traditions of Mem-
ber States concerning search of business premises 94 and pro-
tection of the principle of inviolability of such premises vary
considerably. Nevertheless, they all contain the following two
common features: search of premises must be authorized by
law in force at the moment of the search and fixing the condi-
tions of it; possibility ofjudicial control of the search a priori or
a posteriori. Because an explicit catalogue of protected funda-
mental rights is absent from the Community constitution, ap-
plicants against 14(3) decisions of the Commission often base
their arguments on fundamental rights protected in their na-
192. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R.
2033, 2057, 18, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169, 186; J. Nold, Kohlen-und Baustoffg-
rosshandlung v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, 507, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
338, 354.
193. National Panasonic, [1980] E.C.R. at 2057, 18, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 186.
194. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 9, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 91. Article 14 does not authorize the Commission to carry out investigations in
people's private residence. Id.
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tional constitutions or in the European human rights conven-
tions. If it is undoubtedly true that in an abstract sense both
form part of the general principles of law applied by the Euro-
pean Courts, in National Panasonic the Court of Justice stated
that, "Regulation No. 17, by giving the Commission the pow-
ers to carry out investigations without previous notification"
does not infringe "Article 8 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
of 4 November 1950 whereby 'everyone has the right to re-
spect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence.' "195
The Court ofJustice points out that Article 8(2) of the Eu-
ropean Convention, insofar as it applies to legal persons, ac-
knowledges that such interference is permissible to the extent
to which it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society for the defense of the public interest or the
economic well-being.'9 6 The powers entrusted upon the Com-
mission by the Regulation No. 17/62 correspond precisely to
these two conditions. 97
In the Hoechst judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed
the necessity to respect the rights of defense and the inviolabil-
ity of residence. It stated that
in all the legal systems of the Member States, any interven-
tion by the public authorities in the sphere of private activi-
ties of any person, whether natural or legal, must have a
legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by law,
and, consequently, those systems provide, albeit in different
forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate in-
tervention. The need for such protection must be recog-
nized as a general principle of Community law. 198
Essentially, however, the Court of Justice confirmed that the
Commission has broad inspection powers that must be carried
out
195. National Panasonic, [1980] E.C.R. at 2056-57, 17, 20, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R.
at 186-87.
196. Id. at 2057, 19, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 186.
197. See, however, Michel Waelbroeck, Les Droits de la Defense des Entreprises en
Matire Dententes, 45 ANNALES DE DROIT DE LOUVAIN 67, 70 (1985), doubting that
Council regulation could be qualified as "the law."
198. Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, 2924, 19, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410, 466.
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with the cooperation of the undertakings concerned, either
voluntarily, where there is a written authorization, or by vir-
tue of an obligation arising under a decision ordering an
investigation. In the latter case, ... the Commission's offi-
cials have, inter alia, the power to have shown to them the
documents they request, to enter such premises as they
choose, and to have shown to them the contents of any
piece of furniture which they indicate. On the other hand,
they may not obtain access to premises or furniture by force
or oblige the staff of the undertaking to give them such ac-
cess, or carry out searches without the permission of the
management of the undertaking. 199
If a company opposes the Commission's investigation, the situ-
ation is completely different. According to the Court of Jus-
tice, in such case,
the Commission's officials may, on the basis of Article 14(6)
and without the cooperation of the undertakings, search for
any information necessary for the investigation with the
assistance of the national authorities, which are required to
afford them the assistance necessary for the performance of
their duties. Although such assistance is required only if
the undertaking expresses its opposition, it may also be re-
quested as a precautionary measure, in order to overcome
any opposition on the part of the undertaking.
20 0
Thus, Member States are required to ensure that the Commis-
sion's action is effective. According to the Court, within the
limits imposed by the necessity of efficiency, the appropriate
procedural rules designed to ensure respect for undertakings'
rights are those laid down by national law.20 '
It is clear that in those Member States where prior judicial
authorization is needed to effectuate a search of business
premises, the national legal order must be respected. Insofar,
the criticism 2 0 2 that the Hoechst judgment sets a lower level of
fundamental rights protection than the one safeguarded in
some Member States is unfounded.20 3 The competent author-
ity entrusted with the judicial control under the terms of na-
199. Id. at 2927, 31, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.
200. Id. at 2927-28, 32, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.
201. Id. at 2928, 33, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.
202. See, e.g, Rupert Scholz, Grundrechtsprobleme im Europdischen Karteltrecht: zur
Hoechst-Entscheidung des EuGH, 40 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETrBEWERB 99, 101 (1990).
203. See Bernhard Jansen, Les Pouvoirs D'investigation de la Commission des Corn-
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tional law has to dispose of all the elements necessary to allow
it to exercise its own supervisory powers, but it cannot substi-
tute its own assessment of the need for the investigations or-
dered for that of the Commission, whose assessments of fact
and law are subject only to review by the Court of Justice.20 4
On the other hand, it is within the powers of the national au-
thorities, possibly tribunals or judges, to examine the authen-
ticity of the inspection order, as well as to consider whether the
measures of constraint are arbitrary or excessive having regard
to the subject matter of the investigation and to ensure that the
rules of national law are complied with in the application of
those measures.20 5
While it is, clear that the national judge controls the au-
thenticity and due form of the Article 14(3) order,20 6 the scope
of his scrutiny of the proportionality of the Commission's deci-
sion having regard to the subject matter of the investigation is
still uncertain. 20 7 Some commentators suggest that the na-
tional judge must be able to examine whether the presump-
tions of the Commission are sufficient in order to decide if a
search is disproportionate.2 08  This interpretation of Hoechst
appears too broad. It would substitute the judgment of the
Commission for that of the national controlling authority and
would inevitably result in the questioning of the necessity of an
inspection. The national judge cannot scrutinize the founda-
tion of the Commission's allegations. He decides only if, in
view of the particular circumstances of the search in question
and the subject-matter mentioned in the inspection order,
such a measure appears justified or not. The latter could be
the case if, for instance, the Commission ordered an inspection
to elucidate cartel activities of company A in the sector Y and
requested an authorization to search the premises of a subsidi-
ary B undoubtedly active only in the sector Z.
munautis Europiennes en Matire de Concurrence, 342 REVUE DU MARCH9 COMMUN 696,
697-98 (1990).
204. Hoechst, [1989] E.C.R. at 2928, 35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468-69.
205. Id. at 2928, 35, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468-69.
206. RITrER, ET AL., supra note 39, at 636.
207. VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 185, at 482-83.
208. Marie-Chantal Boutard & Louis Vogel, Limites des Pouvoirs de la Commission
des Communauts Europennes en Matire de Verification Aupris D'entreprises, No. 20,
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d. Powers of the Commission's Inspectors Under
Article 14(1)
Inspectors authorized by the Commission to investigate
are empowered under Article 14(1) to enter any premises,
land, and means of transport of the company; examine books
and business records; take copies of extracts from such books
and business records; and ask for oral evaluations from em-
ployees of such evidence.
1. Enter Any Premises, Land, and Means of Transport
of the Company
The power to enter premises covers all company offices or
plants, including accounting, technical services, executive of-
fices, and archives. Inspectors must be given access to offices,
filing cabinets, desks, briefcases, etc. Even the trunk of the
firm's general manager's car can be opened and its contents
inspected. Premises of third parties, in which books or busi-
ness records have been temporarily or permanently deposited,
can also be inspected.20 9
2. Examine the Books and Other Business Records
Access to premises is only meaningful if it allows access to
the documents which make it possible to establish the factual
situation and eventually report the evidence of infringement.
The terms "books" and "business records" cover any form of
documentation of professional utility or significance including
paper documents, photos or transparencies, magnetic video or
audio tapes, microfilms, computer software, and files, etc.210
They involve in general any recorded information of the busi-
ness activities of the company or its employees regardless of
the medium used to store this information. Access to business
209. See Commission Decision No. 379/84, O.J. L 46/23, art. l(1)(a) (1984) (es-
tablishing powers of Commission agents under treaty establishing European Steel
and Coal Community (ESCS)); RirrER, ET AL., supra note 39, at 639 n.279.
210. Commission Decision No.. 379/84, O.J. L 46/23, art. l(1)(a) (1984). Arti-
cle 1 (a) and (b) of Decision 379/84 on inspection powers of the Commission in. anti-
trust cases in the field of steel and coal makes it clear that business records include
"records [data] held in automated systems of any kind." Id. But see Bernard Amory &
Yves Poullet, Le droit de la preuve face a linformatique et la t l6natique, 37 R.I.D.C. 331
(Avril-Juin 1985) (discussing problems and limitations on the use of computerized
data as evidence).
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records covers not only official documents kept because com-
panies are required to do so by law (invoices, accountancy, fis-
cal declarations, etc.), but also all other documents, correspon-
dence, internal notes, minutes of meetings, manuscript
memos, appointments diaries, travel expense accounts, etc.
All documents found on the company's premises are not nec-
essarily professional. It must be noted, nevertheless, that doc-
uments located in the premises of a company are by presump-
tion of professional character.
Brief consultation of any document by the inspector en-
ables him to qualify it as professional or private, relevant to the
object of the investigation or irrelevant. Private documents as
well as irrelevant business documents are discarded. The com-
pany can also, within the framework of its defense, produce on
its own initiative documents which are favorable to it. The in-
spection warrant or order issued pursuant to Article 14 limits
the scope of investigation to documents only which concern
products or services related to the alleged restrictions of com-
petition. It is not necessary, however, for the Commission to
provide a detailed list of the documents it wishes to inspect. 21 '
The company undergoing the inspection has an obligation
to cooperate actively during the investigation. This involves
opening safes and locked filing cabinets, providing on-the-spot
oral explanations in order to identify the author of a docu-
ment, explaining the filing system of the company's computer,
and the like. Voluntary or negligent omissions or misleading
explanations, which might cause the inspectors to overlook rel-
evant documents, are qualified as incomplete production of
the required books or records and can be fined on the basis of
Article 15(l)(c).
The exact scope of the obligation of active cooperation on
behalf of the company undergoing an inspection has been
specified by the Commission in Fabbrica Pisana.212 During a
"simple" inspection carried out in this company within the
framework of a survey concerning a cartel in the flat-glass sec-
211. Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R.
2859, 2926, 27, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410, 467 (allowing search for documents un-
known at beginning of search); Dow Benelux NV v. Commission, Case 85/87, [1989]
E.C.R. 3137, 3159, 38, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410, 477 (same).
212. O.J. L 75/30 (1980); Fabbrica Lastre di Vetro Pietro Sciarra, O.J. L 75/35
(1980).
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tor in Italy, the company limited its collaboration to putting all
premises and company records at the inspector's disposal, but
it refused to fetch precisely required documents. The Com-
mission imposed on Fabbrica Pisana a fine of ECU5000 pursu-
ant to Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No. 17/62.2 " The Com-
mission stated that "the obligation on undertakings to supply
all documents required by Commission inspectors must be un-
derstood to mean not merely giving access to all files but actu-
ally producing the specific documents required. 2 1 4
3. Take Copies of or Extracts from the Books and
Business Records
Inspectors can take copies of the books and records of
which they require the presentation. They do not have the
power to seize the originals. They may ask to use the firm's
photocopying facilities and should pay for the copies. 2 5
4. Ask for Oral Explanations on the Spot
A good deal of controversy surrounds this possibility. As
the Commission stated in Fabbrica Pisana, 6 the company has a
duty to allow employees with thorough knowledge of the ob-
ject of the inspection to provide oral explanations. It is not
certain that the Commission has the power to interview partic-
ular employees.21 7 Some commentators limit this power only
to the possibility of asking for explanations concerning the
books or professional records being examined. 218 Others ex-
tend it to the conduct under investigation provided that ques-
tions arise out of the examination of the books or records.21 9
If it is clear that a possibly inaccurate response to a request for
oral explanation during the inspection cannot be fined under
Article 15(1)(b), which sanctions only inaccurate information
submitted to the Commission following a request on the basis
213. Fabbrica Pisana, OJ. L 75/30, at 34 (1980).
214. Id. at 33, 10.
215. See RITTER, ET AL., supra note 39, 925-27, app. 22, 8 (containing explana-
tory note to authorization to investigate under Article 14 of Regulation No. 17/62).
216. Fabbrica Pisana, O.J. L 75/30, at 32-33, 10 (1980).
217. RITrER, ET AL., supra note 39, at 639 n.284. But see Kiuhlhorn, supra note
171, at 22-23 (containing further references to these powers).
218. VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 185, at 483, 1109.
219. KERSE, supra note 113, at 105.
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of Article 11, it must nevertheless be considered that the char-
acterized refusal to comply with oral requests for explanation
during the inspection must be regarded as an obstacle to the
exercise of the powers of investigation provided for in Article
14 and can consequently be qualified as a refusal to submit to
an inspection. This may result in the interruption of the in-
spection and, eventually, the implementation of the sanctions
planned for in case of a refusal to submit to an inspection or-
dered by a Commission's decision.
-In its National Panasonic judgment,220 the Court of Justice
confirmed that
[t]he fact that the officials authorized by the Commission, in
carrying out an investigation, have the power to request
during that investigation information on specific questions
arising from the books and business records which they ex-
amine is not sufficient to conclude that an investigation is
identical to a procedure intended only to obtain informa-
tion within the meaning of Article 11 of the regulation. 2 '
If officials of the Commission cannot materially obtain an ex-
planation or an answer to their questions on the spot during
the inspection for some reasons that are not due to a refusal of
the company or a deliberate strategy to put obstacles to the
progress of the investigation, they can resort to obtaining this
answer at 'a later date, by using to this end the procedure pro-
vided for in Article 11 (written request for information). In
case of cartel investigations, written requests for information
are mostly used precisely to complete information gathered
during an inspection or to ask additional questions based on
the evidence found.
In any event, a company cannot, during the inspection, be
faced with the alternative either to have to incriminate itself by
recognizing its participation in a prohibited cartel, or to run
the risk of being sanctioned for inaccurate or -incomplete infor-
mation. As already mentioned above, the same limitation ap-
plies to written requests for information under Article 11.
Moreover, the privilege against self-incrimination is not really
relevant within the framework of a procedure which, unlike an-
220. National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R.
2033, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 169.
221. Id. at 2056, 15, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 186.
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titrust procedures in certain national legal systems, is not gov-
erned by criminal law but is based essentially on the principle
of documentary evidence as opposed to that of evidence by
testimony.
e. Defense to Article 14 Warrants or Orders
As already mentioned above, companies have the right to
refuse an inspection warrant. This is based on the principle
that inspections under EEC legislation can only be carried out
with the collaboration of the company. Otherwise recourse to
national enforcement rules (searches etc.) is necessary. How-
ever, refusal to submit to an inspection has nothing to do with
the privilege against self-incrimination. As far as inspections
are concerned, this principle has the same scope as in cases of
requests for information.222 Further, firms are entitled to have
the inspection order reviewed by the CFI. A reminder of this
possibility is contained in the order according to Article 14(3)
of Regulation No. 17/62.
Application to the CFI does not suspend the inspection
which can continue. All effects of the judicial review are retro-
spective. A successful appeal would prohibit the Commission
from using the materials gathered during the inspection,
otherwise the decision on the infringement might be annulled
insofar as it was based on such evidence. 223 Nevertheless, the
company can also apply for interim measures requesting the
CFI to suspend the execution of the inspection order. The ap-
plicant has to prove that the inspection would cause him some
serious and irreparable injury. It must be noted that this argu-
ment has so far been dismissed by the Court of Justice in the
case of inspections. 24 In any case, in view of the fact that most
Article 14(3) inspections are unannounced, it seems rather dif-
ficult, even with modern communications methods, to obtain
222. See supra text accompanying notes 170-79 (describing defenses to Article. 11
requests or orders).
. 223. Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case 46/87R, [1987] E.C.R. 1549, 1558, 34,
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 430,437-38; Dow Chem. Nederland v. Commission, Case 85/87R,
[1987] E.C.R. 4367, 4372, 17, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 439, 443; Acciaieria e Tubificio di
Brescia v. High Authority, Case 31/59, [19601 E.C.R. 98, 99-100.
224. Dow Chem. Nederland, [1987] E.C.R. at 4372, 16, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 443;
Hoechst, [1987] E.C.R. at 1558, 32, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 437.
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the suspension of an ongoing inspection by means of an in-
terim measures request.
B. Procedural Guarantees During Cartel Investigations
1. Protection of Correspondence Between the Company and
Its Lawyer
Both the Commission 2 25 as well as the Court of Justice 226
had the occasion to specify the extent of immunity granted in
Community law, as in any national legal order, to correspon-
dence exchanged between the accused company and its legal
counsellors. The Court recognized such immunity under the
following two conditions. First, the protected correspondence
has to have been exchanged within the framework of and in
order to ensure the customer's defense. Protection does not
extend therefore to letters, notes, or opinions sent to a com-
pany by a lawyer with the purpose of organizing an infringe-
ment of the rules of competition. Second, it has to be corre-
spondence exchanged with an external lawyer, independent
from the company concerned, and entitled to exercise its func-
tions at least in one Member State of the Community.
The Court stated in AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission that
the requirement as to the position and status as an in-
dependent lawyer, which must be fulfilled by the legal ad-
viser from whom the written communications which may be
protected emanate, is based on a conception of the lawyer's
role as collaborating in the administration ofjustice by the
courts and as being required to provide, in full indepen-
dence, and in the overriding interests of that cause, such
legal assistance as the client needs. The counterpart of that
protection lies in the rules of professional ethics and disci-
pline which are laid down and enforced in the general inter-
est by institutions endowed with the requisite powers for
that purpose. Such a conception reflects the legal traditions
common to the Member States and is also to be found in
225. See Answer to the parliamentary question No. 63/78, O.J. C 188/30, at 31
(1978) (stating that Article 14 empowers the commission to check all correspondence
prepared by law firms and legal consultants); AM & S Europe Ltd., Oj. L 199/31, at
32 (1979) (stating that Commission can determine what documents it needs from
viewing them, and will not trust company's legal advisers to screen any such mate-
rial).
226. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
[1982] 2 CM.L.R. 264.
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the legal order' of the Community, as is demonstrated by
Article 17 of the Protocols on the Statutes of the Court of
Justice of the EEC and the EAEC, and also by Article 20 of
the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
ECSC.227
The same judgment defines an "independent lawyer," as one
"not bound to the client by a relationship of employment. ' 228
This point was sometimes disputed since it excludes de facto
all internal lawyers of the company. Indeed, in certain Mem-
ber States, these internal lawyers can be registered to the bar
and also be subject to a code of professional deontology.
However, in other Member States, internal lawyers are not al-
lowed to represent in court the company which employs them.
For its part, the Commission did not fail to note, that
any extension of the principle of confidentiality would re-
quire an amendment of the law as it now stands and would
place the Commission in breach of the Treaty were it spon-
taneously to renounce exercise of a power of investigation
conferred on it in the public interest by the Council and up-
held by the Court of Justice. Moreover, extension of legal
privilege to in-house lawyers in certain Member States, in
accordance with the various rules of professional ethics in
force, would create differences in the legal systems within
the Community and would also be manifestly incompatible
with the ratio of the Court's decision.229
This is why the Commission will not change its current ap-
proach which conforms to the AM & S case law. Further, re-
garding the problem 230 of "foreign independent lawyers, ' 23
for example, lawyers not being members of a Community bar,
law society, or equivalent bodies and therefore not entitled
fully to practice their profession in at least one of the Member
States, the Commission submitted in 1984 to the Council a rec-
ommendation seeking a mandate to negotiate agreements "be-
227. Id. at 1611-12, 24, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 324.
228. Id. at 1611, 21, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 323.
229. Confidentiality of Legal Documents: Application of the Competition Rules, 16 E.C.
BULL., No. 6, at 43, 2.1.60 (1983).
230. See Waelbroeck, supra note 197, at 72 (considering exclusion justified in
view of the number and diversity of lawyer's rules of ethics in third countries).
231. See Jonathan Faull, Legal Professional Privilege (AM & S): The Commission Pro-
poses International Negotiations, 10 EuR. L. REV. 119 (1985) (discussing approaches to
solving problems of foreign independent lawyers).
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tween the EEC and certain third countries concerning the pro-
tection of legal papers in connection with the application of the
rules of competition. '23 2 Such agreements would confirm and
safeguard the position of third country lawyers and protect
communications between them and companies involved in EC
antitrust procedures, on the basis of reciprocity and equal
treatment. Unfortunately, the proposal was never followed up
by the Council.
The burden of proving the privileged character of a docu-
ment belongs to the company which intends to make use of
this immunity during an inspection. If evidence forwarded by
the company is judged insufficient, the Commission can, on
the basis of Article 11(5), adopt a decision ordering the pro-
duction of the contested documents. The company can appeal
to the Court ofJustice in order to suspend the implementation
of this decision.
2. Professional Secrecy
Article 20(1) of Regulation No. 17/62 specifies that the in-
formation acquired as a result of the application of Articles 11,
12, 13 and 14 can be used only for the purpose of the relevant
request or investigation. It follows from this provision that the
information collected during an inspection can only be used by
the Commission for the current antitrust procedure. The na-
tional authorities assisting the Commission in the investigation
cannot use it to initiate national procedures of any nature
whatsoever (economic or fiscal, antitrust, customs, etc.). Ac-
cording to Article 20(2), neither the Commission, nor the com-
petent authorities of the Member States, their officials and
other servants may disclose information acquired by them as a
result of the application of Regulation No. 17/62, if it is of the
kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, for ex-
ample, if it contains business secrets or other sensitive com-
mercial information.23 3 One of the consequences of this provi-
232. Recommendation for a Council Decision to Authorize the Commission to
Open Negotiations with a View to the Conclusion of Agreements Between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and Certain Third Countries Concerning the Protection
of Legal Paper in Connection with the Application of the Rules on Competition,
COM (84) 548, (October 9, 1984).
233. See Chantal Lavoie, The Investigative Powers of the Commission with Respect to
Business Secrets under Community Competition Rules, 17 EuR. L. REV. 20 (1992).
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sion is that the Commission, when publishing in the Official
Journal of the European Communities the decisions implementing
Articles 85 or 86 of the EEC Treaty, occults information con-
cerning business secrets, except in cases where the specific in-
formation constituting the business secret is itself the constitu-
ent component of the infringement (for example, the invoiced
price, if the detected infringement is a price fixing agreement).
Another consequence is that it obliges the Commission to
take care to avoid any unnecessary disclosure of business
secrets, when it gives to the companies receiving a Statement
of Objections access to its files in order to enable them to pre-
pare their defense. Companies are allowed during access to
files to examine and take copies only of documents which are
accessible or partially accessible to them. However, documen-
tary evidence of a cartel cannot be withheld from other incrim-
inated companies on grounds that it contains business secrets
of a cartel member.2 3 ' This would violate the principle accord-
ing to which the accused firm must be given the possibility to
see and comment on the evidence brought against it.
Parties to the procedure are also entitled to take copies of
documents obtained by means of an Article 14 inspection and
constituting evidence of an infringement. The Commission
must, however, thoroughly motivate its decision to disclose
such information and, in any case, afford the party concerned
by the disclosure of information it considers sensitive the pos-
sibility to bring action before the Court of Justice.23 5
3. Access to the File
Before taking an unfavorable decision, the Commission
gives companies concerned the opportunity of being heard on
the matters to which the Commission has taken objection. In
practice a statement of objections is addressed to the company,
which responds to these objections in writing and, if necessary,
orally during a hearing. According to consistent case law of
the Court of Justice, 236 recalled by the Commission in its Elev-
234. See Julian M. Joshua, Information in EEC Competition Law Procedures, 11 EUR.
L. REv. 409, 423 (1986) (discussing lawyer-client confidentiality).
235. AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, Case 53/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1965, 1991-
92, 26-30, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 231, 258-60.
236. E.g., Etablissements Consten S~rl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Com-
mission, Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 249, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418; ACF
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enth Report on Competition Policy,231 in its statement of objections
the Commission can state only the essential facts on which its
objections are based.
Nevertheless in its Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Reports,
the Commission went beyond the requirements formulated by
the Court in giving to the suspected companies the opportu-
nity to take knowledge of the file concerning the case in ques-
tion.238 Thus, companies involved in a procedure are invited
to come and consult the documents which are accessible to
them on the Commission's premises. Principally accessible are
documents used as evidence by the Commission against the
company receiving the statement of objections. Further, re-
ports drawn up after an inspection and containing a purely fac-
tual account thereof are accessible to the firm which was sub-
ject to the investigation. Statements made by employees or
other staff of the company will normally be made available to
all parties concerned to the extent that they constitute evi-
dence of an infringement and figure in the statement of objec-
tions.
On the other hand, the final evaluation reports of the
Commission's officials, possibly established after one or more
inspections, are considered internal documents of the Com-
mission and as such they are not accessible. In addition, the
Commission regards as confidential, and therefore inaccessible
to the companies involved in the procedure, documents or
parts thereof containing other undertakings' business secrets,
internal Commission documents, such as notes, drafts, or
other working papers, as well as any other confidential infor-
mation, such as documents enabling complainants to be identi-
fied where they wish to remain anonymous, and information
disclosed to the Commission subject to an obligation of confi-
dentiality. However, documents containing business secrets or
Chemiefarma NV v. Commission, Joined Cases 41,44-45/69, [1970] E.C.R. 661; ICI,
Case 48/69, [1972] E.C.R. 619, [1972] C.M.L.R. 557; Hoffmann-La Roche v. Com-
mission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 211; Heintz van
Landewyck S~rl v. Commission, Cases 209-215 & 218/78, [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [1981]
3 C.M.L.R. 134.
237. See COMMISSION ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 22-25
(1981) (discussing access to Commission files).
238. COMMISSION ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1981); CoMMIS-
SION TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1982); COMMISSION THIRTEENTH RE-
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1983).
CARTELS: PROOF AND PROCEDURE
qualified as confidential by the company communicating them,
that contain information used in the statement of objections as
evidence proving an infringement of competition rules, are ex-
cluded from the confidentiality protection and are normally
communicated to all members of a cartel.
CONCLUSION
It was always clear from the standing jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice that the evidential standards of the Commis-
sion had to be very high. However, they were still those of an
administrative and not of a criminal procedure. As regards in
particular first instance jurisprudence in the recent cartel
cases, the CFI is obviously not ready to accept evidence which
is not established "to the requisite legal standard." It remains
to be seen whether this legal standard should be interpreted as
"proof beyond reasonable doubt" that certain firms were oper-
ating a restrictive cartel over a period of time as evidenced by a
convincing body of documentary, economic, and other circum-
stantial evidence, as the Court of Justice has always interpreted
it, or whether it is even stricter, requiring the Commission to
provide direct evidence that each member of the cartel partici-
pated in each individual infringing act during the totality of the
duration of the cartel and prove also the causality link between
such participation and the restrictive effects of the specific in-
fringement on competition. It is to be hoped that the CFI will
find the occasion to clarify its position on "the requisite legal
standard" regarding evidence in cartel cases.
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